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The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The nonprofit 2 sector and matters of nonprofit governance have
been in the national spotlight much of late. 3 One area of heightened
1. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 51
(1914). The context for this comment relates to the cronyism in bank boards of
trustees that was endemic to the banking industry in the early 1900s. Brandeis
wrote a series of articles that appeared in Harper's Weekly opposing the state of
interlocking boards in banking because they facilitated a "money monopoly" that
concentrated power in the hands of a few wealthy and powerful men. See id. at 1
(quoting Governor Woodrow Wilson (before he became President Wilson)). Bran-
deis later states that the "nexus between all the large potentially competing cor-
porations must be severed if the Money Trust is to be broken." Id. at 78. The
power in healthcare is not nearly as concentrated in boards of directors as it once
was in the banking industry, but the warning reminds us to question the status
quo.
2. A nonprofit corporation can be better described as not profit sharing. The corpo-
ration can earn a profit, but any profit must be used to carry out the mission of
the corporation and cannot inure to the benefit of individuals who work for the
organization or to other private parties. The rules are dictated by the state in
which the corporation is incorporated. Being a nonprofit corporation must be dis-
tinguished from having tax-exempt status, which is a federal status granted by
the Internal Revenue Service that allows the corporation to avoid certain federal
taxes so long as it meets certain requirements. While the two are related, they
are fundamentally different legal issues that are often combined and/or confused.
See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1578,
1581-83 (1992) (describing the nature of the nonprofit corporate form).
3. See, e.g., PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY Gov-
ERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (2005) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], availa-
ble at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel FinalReport.pdf. This project,
sponsored by Independent Sector (a private coalition of nonprofit organizations
that studies the nonprofit sector) and presented to the Senate Finance Commit-
tee at its request, provides an example of the focus on the charitable sector. The
panel submitted a report of more than one hundred pages to the Senate Finance
Committee enumerating the ways in which the nonprofit sector (an incredibly
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interest is directors of healthcare entities regularly serving on the
board of more than one healthcare organization. Even when board
membership of related entities is relatively independent, one corpora-
tion's business plan frequently is affected (or even controlled) by the
business needs of a separately incorporated parent, affiliate, or other
related organization. Very little case law addresses "interlocking" di-
rectorates for nonprofit board members, and the case law that does
exist tends to address narrow, fact-based state law interpretive issues
rather than elucidating the nature and scope of fiduciary duties. The
result is that the doctrine in this area is severely underdeveloped.4
State statutes and supplementary guidance documents such as the
Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act provide little insight as well.
Within this vacuum, considerable tension exists between the modern
reality of overlapping boards, which often occur due to integration of
healthcare entities into "delivery systems," and the traditional doc-
large number of corporations and corporate missions are included in this
thought) is invaluable to the United States, how the sector can improve itself,
and what government can do (or should refrain from doing) to improve trans-
parency, governance, and accountability (as the title suggests). See id. As an
example of the focus on governance, the panel recommended the following:
As a matter of recommended practice, charitable organizations should
adopt and enforce a conflict of interest policy consistent with its state
laws and organizational needs. The IRS should require every charitable
organization to disclose on its Form 990 series return whether it has
such a policy. Charitable organizations should also adopt policies and
procedures that encourage and protect individuals who come forward
with credible information on illegal practices or violations of adopted pol-
icies of the organization. There should be a vigorous sectorwide effort to
educate and encourage all charitable organizations, regardless of size, to
adopt and enforce policies and procedures to address possible conflicts of
interest and to facilitate reporting of suspected malfeasance and miscon-
duct by organization managers.
Id. at 8.
4. See, e.g., Healthamerica Pa., Inc. v. Susquehanna Health Sys., 278 F. Supp. 2d
423 (2003) (reviewing the mergers that created an integrated delivery system and
determining that they did not violate the antitrust principles of the Clayton Act);
Health Maint. Network v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1043 (1988)
(discussing certain bylaw amendments that were contrary to California law and
inconsistent with principles of corporate independence for a subsidiary); Manhat-
tan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer (MEETH), 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct.
1999) (denying a petition to sell a historic nonprofit hospital for failure to prove
that the transaction was fair and reasonable); Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v.
Richmond County, 336 S.E.2d 562 (Ga. 1985) (examining the actions of a public
authority in running a hospital and selling some of its assets); see also John K.
Wells, Multiple Directorships: The Fiduciary Duties and Conflicts of Interest that
Arise When One Individual Serves More than One Corporation, 33 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 561, 563 (2000) (lamenting that courts have given conflicting guidance on
the duties of directors of for-profit, general corporations that serve multiple
boards).
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trine of fiduciary duties, which contemplates that directors will serve
only one corporation. 5
It is a long-standing principle of corporate law that directors owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation(s) on whose boards they sit.6 Non-
profit directors' fiduciary duties are threefold: the duty of care, the
duty of loyalty, and the duty of obedience. 7 The duty of care requires
directors to act in an informed, careful manner in their decisionmak-
ing.8 The duty of loyalty commands directors to act without self-inter-
est, in good faith, and in the best interests of the corporation at all
times. 9 The duty of obedience obliges directors to ensure that the
charitable mission of the corporation is carried out and to obey laws
relevant to the organization.1 0 While the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty are well established, the duty of obedience is a more recent
development and not fully incorporated into the canon of nonprofit fi-
duciary duties.1 1
5. See Melissa Middleton, Nonprofit Boards of Directors: Beyond the Governance
Function, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 141, 141 (Walter
W. Powell ed., 1987) ("Only a meager amount of literature is available to help
frustrated board members and managers.").
6. See Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1862). Justice
Davis stated the fiduciary principle as follows:
Instead of honestly endeavoring to effect a loan of money, advanta-
geously, for the benefit of the corporation, these directors, in violation of
their duty, and in betrayal of their trust, secured their own debts, to the
injury of the stockholders .... Directors cannot thus deal with the im-
portant interests entrusted to their management. They hold a place of
trust, and by accepting the trust are obliged to execute it with fidelity,
nor for their own benefit, but for the common benefit of the stockholders
of the corporation.
Id.
7. See James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218,
229-30 (2003). For-profit directors must only adhere to the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty; the duty of obedience is applied only to nonprofit corporations.
Query whether the duty of obedience should apply to for-profit healthcare enti-
ties, which still must abide by rules of licensure and statutory mission; perhaps
that is a question for another paper.
8. See 1 ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MICHAEL F. ANTHONY, JOEL L. MICHAELS & RONALD N.
SUTTER, HEALTH LAW PRACTICE GUIDE 6-63 to -64 (2003) (citing N.Y. NOT-FOR-
PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720-a (McKinney 2006)).
9. See Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law,
and Ethics of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345 1380-82 (2003)
(describing fiduciary duties from a state law perspective).
10. See MICHAEL W. PEREGRINE & JAMES R. SCHWARTZ, THE APPLICATION OF NON-
PROFIT CORPORATION LAW TO HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 40-41 (2002) (citing
DANIEL KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS (Moyer Bell
Ltd. 1988)).
11. To wit, the American Law Institute has been in the process of creating Principles
of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, and the draft document does not sepa-
rately delineate the duty of obedience; instead, it discusses the director's duty to
adhere to laws applicable to the organization as a part of the duty of care. See
A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 305(b) cmt. (Pre-
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Three examples will help to illustrate the strains and conflicts that
are endemic in modern nonprofit governance. The first relates to inte-
gration of the finance and service aspects of healthcare and the con-
flicts that may be predestined to arise in healthcare systems that have
integrated these functions (known as vertically integrated delivery
systems). The break-up of Allina Health System by the Minnesota At-
torney General serves as a parable, as it illuminates the critical issue
of whether the duty of loyalty and the duty of obedience can be
honored while serving on more than one board of directors when the
corporations are related but have conflicting licensure mandates. The
second example hypothesizes an urban-suburban hospital system and
the typical conflicts of interest that arise when multiple healthcare
entities that provide essentially the same services join forces by con-
tract and agree to be governed by one umbrella board of directors or by
boards of directors with overlapping members (called horizontal inte-
gration). The third example is a smaller, community-based hospital
and home health agency that share board members; this model exists
in many communities across the country and highlights the idea that
even when integration has not occurred, business plans can affect
close entities. Each of the three examples raises questions about over-
lapping directors' duties, particularly the duties of loyalty and
obedience.
The current reality of the healthcare industry and corporations in
general is that directors sit on multiple boards.12 Some would argue
(as did Justice Brandeis in another context) that this practice should
be halted entirely because it is nothing but a grab at power and con-
trol by individuals attempting to avoid certain constraints of the cor-
porate form. While the argument has merit, this Article will focus on
the extant problem, as the complete cessation of such interlocking
boards does not appear to be immediately attainable. Board members
are entitled to more certain guidance, and the communities they serve
are entitled to socially responsible nonprofit institutions.13 Therefore,
liminary Draft No. 3, 2005) (on file with author). The draft document recognizes
that the organic documents of the nonprofit may help guide directors, but the
drafters deliberately did not separate the duty of obedience doctrinally. See id. at
70. The ALI drafters appear concerned with the influence of trust law and the
restrictions of cy pres-type doctrine. See id. at 32. Given the restrictions that are
imposed on healthcare entities due to the licensure aspect of their organizational
mission, the flexibility envisioned by the ALI drafters could not exist for health-
care entities. Further, adherence to the duty of obedience might aid directors in
their quest to serve multiple organizations well and fairly.
12. The authors of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act acknowledge this in
the commentary. See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31 cmt. (1987) [here-
inafter RMNCA] (recognizing that board members are often chosen for their abil-
ity to make connections for an entity).
13. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 2 ("Public trust is essential to a viable non-
profit sector.").
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the time is ripe to modify the doctrine of fiduciary duties so that it
encompasses this reality of overlapping boards; recognizes the trend
toward more global, comprehensive, and proactive governance in the
healthcare sector; and enables directors to decipher, document, and
resolve conflicts at a more meaningful point in their decisionmaking
processes. If we want high-level stewardship to steer board members
faced with conflicts, then we must provide a substantive doctrine that
guides and that can be employed easily by the largest and smallest,
most and least sophisticated institutions.14
This Article first discusses the three examples of overlap in non-
profit boards of directors to create a frame of reference for analyzing
this feature of nonprofit boards. Next, the Article describes and ana-
lyzes the deficiencies in the doctrine of fiduciary duties as they are
traditionally defined, why fiduciary duties must better guide directors
in serving multiple boards, and how the duty of obedience can become
doctrinally more potent by bifurcating the defined and guiding mis-
sion of the organization into what I have dubbed "charter mission"
(meaning the nonprofit corporate mission as suggested by the state's
nonprofit act) and "licensure mission" (meaning the healthcare mis-
sion as dictated by state licensure statutes and regulations). The Arti-
cle then briefly addresses the reasons why the usual approach to
conflicts by for-profit corporations-inform and recuse-is insufficient
for healthcare nonprofits. Finally, the Article sets forth a proposal
that includes the procedural and substantive modifications necessary
to catalyze a shift in understanding and to achieve the level of gui-
dance that directors and their organizations so clearly need.
14. Also, boards must be able to decipher and solve conflicts of interest before getting
so embroiled in resulting problems that attorneys general intervene, as they have
been doing with more regularity lately. See Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M.
Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Healthcare Enterprise, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1, 2-3 (2004) (discussing the overreaching of
state attorneys general in recent efforts at controlling the activities of nonprofits
and the reasons that such "activism" is inappropriate); see also Dana Brakman
Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Non-
profit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 205, 206-07 (2004) (noting that "ac-
tivist state AGs" have become more active in overseeing the activities of
nonprofits, going so far as to propose financial accountability legislation that mir-
rors Sarbanes-Oxley); Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternal-
ism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 940-41 (2004)
(describing the rise in state attorney general activity in the nonprofit sector as a
rise in "parochialism and paternalism"); Michael W. Peregrine & James R.
Schwartz, Key Nonprofit Corporate Law Developments in 2002, 12 HEALTH L.
REP. 324, 328 (2003) (suggesting that, in order to diffuse attorney general atten-
tion to parent/subsidiary fiduciary conflicts, counsel to healthcare organizations
with such structures should draft affiliation agreements that anticipate potential
conflicts of interest and where loyalties lie in the event that conflicts arise).
[Vol. 85:681
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II. UNDERSTANDING BOARD OVERLAP IN HEALTHCARE
Historically, the overlap in nonprofits' boards of directors has not
been accidental, nor has it been a necessarily bad thing. In fact, the
creation of connections for business purposes and for development of
resources has been important for all nonprofits, not just those within
the healthcare industry.1 5 This was particularly true when nonprofits
were generally small businesses that relied on volunteer community
leaders to complete their boards of directors, who in turn created op-
portunities and obtained benefits for their nonprofits. 16 Healthcare
has become an industry of large, sophisticated, and interconnected
businesses, and boards of directors continue to overlap between
healthcare entities. This occurs for a variety of reasons, ranging from
the economic sensibilities of alignment (as with vertically integrated
delivery systems) to the business strategy of connecting entities to
capture markets (as with horizontally integrated healthcare sys-
tems).17 In smaller communities, the reasons for board overlap ap-
pear not to have changed over time; small communities still rely on
limited pools of volunteers.
Each of the three examples discussed below involves affiliation
and/or integration of healthcare entities, which has become customary
in the industry during the past twenty or so years. S Horizontal inte-
gration indicates the merger or alignment of several entities within
the same market that provide essentially the same types of services in
order to capture the market and to encourage efficiencies. 1 9 More spe-
cifically, in a horizontally integrated system, a number of hospitals in
15. See Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of the Private Nonprofit Sector, in
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 5, at 3, 14 (describing nonprofit development
in the United States and providing historic examples of board overlap in non-
profit organizations, such as Walter S. Gifford serving on the boards of the Rocke-
feller Foundation and the National Research Fund).
16. See Middleton, supra note 5, at 143 (commenting that nonprofit board members
tend to create interorganizational "linkages" by having board members who are
affiliated with a number of community groups).
17. See Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems and
Antitrust, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1516 (1994) (describing the ways in which
integrated delivery systems promote efficiency in the context of managed care
contracting).
18. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Decision-Makers Without Duties: Defining the Duties
of Parent Corporations Acting as Sole Corporate Members in Nonprofit Health
Care Systems, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 979, 985-88 (2001) (describing the trend of
consolidation and affiliation in the healthcare industry).
19. See Douglas A. Conrad & Stephen M. Shortell, Integrated Health Systems: Prom-
ise and Performance, FRONTIERS HEALTH MGMT., Fall 1996, at 3, 4-5, 7, reprinted
in INTEGRATED DELIVERY SYSTEMS: CREATION, MANAGEMENT, AND GOVERNANCE 3
(1998); see also Michelle M. Mello et al., Fostering Rational Regulation of Patient
Safety, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 375, 415 (2005) (noting that insurers have
successfully worked with integrated delivery systems to create monetary incen-
tives to improve quality of care).
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varied locations with different specialties might affiliate in order to
consolidate resources and thus create greater efficiencies through
economies of scale and through creation of centers of excellence. 20
The trend of health system integration was first experienced as hori-
zontal integration of healthcare entities and then moved toward verti-
cal integration. 2 1 In the healthcare context, vertical integration refers
generally to the combination of finance and service that theoretically
increases economic efficiencies by reducing risk for the payor and by
increasing revenue through aligning the interests of healthcare fi-
nance and healthcare provider. 2 2 Thus, a home health agency, long-
term care facility, hospital, ambulatory care facility, and managed-
care organization might affiliate to create a unified organism of care
in a vertically integrated system.23 The key feature, though, is the
alignment of finance and service.
Other industries generally effectuate vertical and horizontal align-
ment by merger; in the healthcare industry, however, the possibilities
of integration often are limited to creating alignment of interests and
mechanisms of control by two methods-contract and governance.
The parties to the integration will enforce the alignment by drafting
contracts requiring certain behaviors and by oversight of one an-
other's enterprises via overlapping board membership and/or creation
of parent-subsidiary corporate family trees.2 4 Healthcare entities
that would choose to merge, believing it to be a benefit to both parties,
are frequently precluded from doing so directly and are required to
maintain separate incorporation for any number of the following rea-
sons: licensure; accreditation; Medicare provider status; asset protec-
tion (which is key in a business that frequently experiences tort
liability); Medicare and Medicaid rules regarding fraud and abuse;
and preservation of tax exemption if some business activities are con-
sidered taxable. So, for example, a hospital is licensed to be a hospital
in each state in which the hospital provides services, and an HMO is
licensed to be an HMO in each state in which the HMO assumes the
20. See Conrad & Shortell, supra note 19, at 8.
21. See id. at 4 (explaining the trend during the 1970s and 80s toward horizontal
integration and the subsequent movement toward vertically (or "virtually") inte-
grated healthcare systems).
22. See id. at 5. Vertical integration in healthcare has also been referred to as "diver-
sification" indicating the intent to control the "delivery of a continuum of health
services to defined populations." Id.
23. See id. at 9.
24. See Greaney & Boozang, supra note 14, at 23 (noting the general structure of
integrated delivery systems in the context of describing Allina and its fight with
the Minnesota attorney general); see also Greaney, supra note 17, at 1517-18
(describing degrees of integration in the context of the constantly shifting health-
care markets of the early 1990s).
[Vol. 85:681
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risk of healthcare finance. 25 The two cannot generally merge without
running afoul of state department of health licensure proscriptions,
resulting in inefficient business practices as each branch of the busi-
ness seeks to comply with the regulatory requirements of the other;
putting at risk the statutorily required insurance reserves of the man-
aged care entity in the event of a successful malpractice recovery; and
risking the tax-exempt status of the hospital because of the (usually)
taxable status of the managed care entity.
Healthcare entities have responded by creating integrated systems
wherein the component parts are separately incorporated, intending
that each component operates to the benefit of the whole, and with a
single corporate parent orchestrating the unified operation. 2 6 One of
the critical tools used by these systems to accomplish the goal of a
"unified whole" is overlapping directorates, and integration generally
results in an "interorganizational alliance."2 7 The existence of multi-
ple separate entities working together but separately incorporated
creates conflicts that are highly likely to recur, as tension is never re-
lieved by a true organizational merger. 28 And so, three examples fol-
low to demonstrate different aspects of the difficulty with the current
standards for fiduciary duties as applied to overlapping boards of non-
profit healthcare organizations. The first example is Allina, the sec-
ond is a horizontally integrated hospital system, and the third is a
local and informally integrated healthcare system.
25. Staff-model HMOs are an exception; however, but for Kaiser Permanente, they
appear to have failed as an experiment. For a new take on Kaiser Permanente,
see Steve Lohr, Is Kaiser the Future of American Health Care?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
31, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/31/business/yourmoney/. The article
asserts that the Kaiser Permanente version of staff-model HMOs is the wave of
the future in healthcare because Kaiser manages care, not just costs, as other
staff-model HMOs do. A policy expert at the World Health Organization, Neelam
Sekhri, was quoted thus: "What works at Kaiser is the integration of the financ-
ing and delivery of care, and the aligned incentives that allow you to make more
rational decisions about health care for members." Id. at 4. Other staff-model
HMOs appear to have failed because they manage only cost, not care.
26. In the past this model has been described by some as a "foundation model" inte-
grated delivery system, but the reality is consistent with the old adage, "If you've
seen one, you've seen one." For a brief description of foundation model systems,
see Greaney, supra note 17, at 1519-20.
27. See Conrad & Shortell, supra note 19, at 7.
28. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM., STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST EN-
FORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/in-
dustryguide/policy/hlth3s.pdf. Since these policy statements, very little guidance
has been issued by the FTC or the DOJ on integration for healthcare entities. See
Robert F. Leibenluft & Tracy E. Weir, Clinical Integration: Assessing the Anti-
trust Issues, in HEALTH LAw HANDBOOK 1, 3-5 (Alice G. Gosfield, ed. 2004).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:681
A. The Story of Allina Health System
The tale of Allina Health System (Allina) is instructive because its
story illustrates the difficulties of vertical integration from corporate,
financial, and licensure perspectives. Allina also demonstrates trends
in integration, as Allina was initially a horizontally integrated system
consisting of separately incorporated hospitals, clinics, outpatient fa-
cilities, and other such direct patient care facilities named Health-
Span Health System (HealthSpan). HealthSpan integrated with
Medica Health Plans (Medica), a nonprofit, separately incorporated
health maintenance organization (HMO).29 HealthSpan and Medica
combined as separately incorporated "divisions" of an unincorporated
vertically integrated healthcare delivery system that became Allina. 3 0
Paradoxically, the Allina union resulted from Minnesota legislation
that called for the formation of "integrated service networks" (ISNs),
which were essentially vertically integrated delivery systems. 3 1
29. Allina Health System was a complex organism consisting of "19 hospitals, 48
medical clinics, one HMO, two insurance companies, a preferred provider organi-
zation, a third party administrator, a home healthcare service, a transportation
service, an equipment company, nursing homes, three foundations, printing com-
panies, and a web service entity." OFFICE OF MINN. ATTORNEY GENERAL MIKE
HATCH, COMPLIANCE REVIEW: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST § 2.1, at 1 (2001) (on file
with author) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE REVIEW]. Medica was a fully functioning
and profitable solo HMO before the merger that formed the Allina health system
in 1994, and it was the second largest HMO in Minnesota, covering approxi-
mately 580,000 enrollees. Id. pt. 2, §§ 1.1, 1.4, at 3-4, 8.
30. See COMPLIANCE REVIEW, pt. 1, § 1.11, at 25 (noting that the fundamental goal of
a merger between Allina and Medica that occurred in 1994 was to create an IDS).
Allina Health System was a tax-exempt charitable organization under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3), but Medica was a tax-exempt social-welfare organization under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(4). See id. pt. 2, § 2.1, at 2. The chief difference is that a social-welfare
organization may lobby.
31. See id. pt. 1, § 1.3, at 5 (discussing the MinnesotaCare Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. §
62N.02 (repealed 1997)). Though the MinnesotaCare Act was ultimately aban-
doned, the mergers that it encouraged remained intact. MinnesotaCare Act was
an interesting example of the effort to encourage integration that occurred across
the country to encourage greater efficiencies in healthcare delivery and finance.
The Minnesota Health Care Commission was charged with presenting a cost con-
tainment plan that would slow the healthcare spending growth rate in Minnesota
by January 1993. Minnesota Health Care Commission, Containing Costs in Min-
nesota's Health Care System, http://www.health.state.mn.us/mhcc/costcont.htm
(last updated Sept. 12, 2006). The commission's cost containment plan featured,
among other things, Integrated Service Networks (ISNs), which encouraged the
development of competing ISNs that were to be accountable for the cost and qual-
ity of their services and responsible for providing a full array of healthcare ser-
vices. See id. ISN services were to be provided at fixed prices, which were
intended to create incentives for participating providers and health plans to oper-
ate efficiently. See id. The commission called for payment systems, purchasing
reform, and healthcare data systems to facilitate consumers' ability to compare
data on ISN prices and quality and to encourage competition. See id.; see also
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.015 (West 2005). The bill was signed by Governor Carl-
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Once concatenated, Medica generated approximately fifty percent
of all revenue for the Allina Health System, despite its proportionally
small size within the conglomerate, and it was controlled tightly by
Allina.3 2 Allina had an umbrella board of directors comprised of
twenty voting members and up to eight ex officio members (including
the president and chief executive officer of Allina).3 3 Of the twenty
Allina board members, seven served on the Medica board of directors
(separately), which contained seven board members total.3 4 Of the
seven board members, Allina had the ability to elect and remove four
directors, and the other three board members served at the pleasure of
Allina (had to be ratified by Allina).3 5 In simplified form, indulging
the need to overlook some of the many subsidiary and sub-subsidiary
relationships, the Allina Health System can be depicted as follows:36
son in April of 1992, and it made Minnesota one of the first states to address the
"epidemic" of rising healthcare costs. See Eric H. Chadwick, MinnesotaCare:
Workable Financing or Just Wishful Thinking?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 961,
963 (1993); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62J.015-.29 (West 2005). The Min-
nesotaCare Act was enacted in pieces dating from 1992 to 1995. See TERESA A.
COUGHLIN, SHRUTI RAJAN, STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN & JILL A. MARSTELLER, URBAN
INST., HEALTH POLICY FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE IN MINNESOTA 1 (1997), http:ll
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/Hp-minn.pdf. Following multiple mergers, Min-
nesota was left with "four mega systems;" Allina, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Min-
nesota, Fairview, and Health Partners insured ninety percent of the state's
residents by 2001. See KaiserNetwork.org, Health Care Marketplace: Minnesota
Health System 'Under Siege' as Costs, Premiums Rise Faster than National Av-
erage (July 24, 2001), http://www.kaisernetwork.org/dailyreports/rep-index.
cfm?hint=3&DR_ID=5976. The consolidation of the state's healthcare systems
caused concern among Minnesota policymakers, who worried that the savings
from the ISN consolidations would not be passed through as reduced consumer
premiums and healthcare service costs. See COUGHLIN ET AL., supra, at 3. As a
result, Minnesota made efforts to prevent further consolidations, but it did not
undo extant ISNs; the 1997 version of the MinnesotaCare Act sought to
"eliminat[e] integrated service networks" in favor of alternative service delivery
mechanisms, such as Community Integrated Service Networks (CISNs), purchas-
ing cooperatives, and provider-sponsored organizations. 1997 Minn. Sess. Law
Serv. ch. 225 (West 1997). Finally, the ISN law was repealed and draft ISN rules
were discarded. See MINN. DEP'T OF HEALTH, 1997 MINNESOTACARE GROWTH
LIMIT IMPLEMENTATION REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1999) (on file with author).
MinnesotaCare proved to be a failed experiment; between 2000 and 2001, Minne-
sota's healthcare costs rose nearly twice as fast as the national average. Duane
Benson, a former supporter of MinnesotaCare, commented that the final result
was "not what we thought it would be." See KaiserNetwork.org, supra.
32. See COMPLIANCE REVIEW, supra note 29, pt. 2, § 2.3, at 5.
33. See id. § 2.2, at 3.
34. See id.
35. See id. exhibit 6 (providing fifth restated bylaws of Medica health plans).
36. See id. pt. 1, exhibit 5. The organizational chart is highly complex and the key is
difficult to decipher due to the variety of corporate entities involved; any errors
are due to the author's inability to read the attorney general's organizational
chart as it was intended.
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8 nonprofit 3 joint 10 partnerships 7 taxable nonprofits 5 for-profit
healthcare ventures (one of which was enterprises
providers (seemingly HealthSpan Medical including
taxable) 2 trusts Management, the Medica
parent company for Insurance
Medica Insurance Company
Company, a for-profit
corporation)
As part of a compliance review of Allina, Minnesota Attorney Gen-
eral Mike Hatch issued a six-volume finding that concluded Allina and
Medica could not coexist as an integrated delivery system.37 Attorney
General Hatch found that the boards of Medica and Allina were guilty
of a host of errors that violated their fiduciary duties. To name a few:
First, the boards of each entity overlapped to a great degree and were
elected solely by, or had to be approved by, Allina's directors. 38 More-
over, the board of Allina and the board of Medica met at the same
time, and, at concurrent meetings, the Allina board members ap-
peared to make all decisions for both Allina and Medica, referring to
Medica as a "division" even though it was a separate corporation. 3 9
Second, one checking account was used for all Allina Health Sys-
tem corporations (not just Allina and Medica). 4 0 The attorney general
acknowledged that this would not be unusual for one large corpora-
tion. Because Allina consisted of numerous for-profit and nonprofit
37. See id. § 1.11, at 27. Hatch wrote that there were "numerous and irreconcilable
conflicts of interest among the non-profit corporations and the communities they
serve." Id.
38. See id. § 1.10, at 22; see also id. exhibit 62 (providing article VII of the bylaws of
Allina Health System, which state that the Board of Directors of Allina was re-
sponsible for electing all Operating Unit Boards). Consumer members of the
Medica board were elected by extant consumer members of the board, but they
had virtually no voting rights except to elect the next set of consumer directors;
though not elected by the Allina directors, they could not be elected without ap-
proval of the Allina board. See id. pt. 2, § 2.3, at 6.
39. See id. § 2.16, at 32 (so referred in the board minutes).
40. See id. The Compliance Review notes that, in using one central business office,
the system used one checking account to process "in aggregate over $3 billion."
Id. § 2.8, at 14.
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corporations, however, Hatch stated that an accounting impossibility
was created and deemed it a deliberate scheme to confuse the govern-
ment and other interested parties.41 Hatch also concluded that the
"crisscross transactions" that occurred between the corporations in the
one checking account were breaches of the directors' three fiduciary
duties.42
Third, Medica paid referral fees to certain influential physician
groups to increase patient referrals from those groups to Allina. 43
This served as evidence that the directors and officers of Allina who
also served as directors and officers of Medica were serving the corpo-
rate interests and purposes of Allina at all times, not of Medica. This
in turn created a conflict of interest.44
Fourth, Medica prefunded the medical services of Allina to finance
capital improvements needed by Allina; more specifically, Medica paid
Allina $30 million before medical records existed for the patients who
had received services. 45 Attorney General Hatch found the pre-fund-
ing arrangement to be contrary to the sound fiscal practices of a con-
ventional HMO and a violation of the directors' fiduciary duties.46
The attorney general also was troubled by Allina's control over
Medica's ability to set fee schedules and by the increased payments
that Medica conferred on Allina.47
Fifth, Medica's decision to remain in the Medicare+Choice mar-
ket-when it was losing money in that market-was deemed the re-
sult of a conflict of interest. The decision clearly benefited Allina by
virtue of the increased hospital admissions of well-insured patients.
Allina earned a large amount of its revenue from the senior market,
but this decision deprived Medica of needed funds. 48
41. See id. at 14-15.
42. See id. at 15.
43. See id. § 2.7, at 12. For instance, in 1998 Medica paid Aspen Clinic approxi-
mately $13 million to build patient referrals to Allina and $1.5 million in subse-
quent years to continue the influence. See id. This is potentially a violation of
certain federal statutes such as the anti-kickback statute, the "Stark" law, and
any state prohibitions on fee splitting, but such fraud and abuse statutes were
not the focus of Attorney General Hatch's investigation (or this Article).
44. See id. at 13. Attorney General Hatch asserts a breach of all three fiduciary du-
ties in the context of the referral fees. See id. The fees were not in the financial
interest of Medica, thus the accusation of only acting in Allina's interest.
45. See id. § 2.9, at 16. Typically insurers review medical records to ensure reasona-
bleness and medical necessity before paying healthcare providers for the services
or items claimed. Prepaying is almost unheard of.
46. See id. at 17.
47. See id. § 2.11, at 20.
48. See id. § 2.14, at 25. By example, even though only 6.5% of enrollment in Medica
was attributable to Medicare, Medicare policies were responsible for 20% of net
operating losses for Medica in 1999. See id. As Attorney General Hatch wrote,
"[Tihere was a clear conflict of interest between Allina Health Systems and
Medica as it related to the Medicare patient. Medica steadily lost money on Medi-
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Sixth, the Minnesota Attorney General's office found that conflicts
of interest arose between the mission of Medica as an HMO and the
mission of Allina Health System; conflicts that appeared to deprive
the Medica directors of the ability to consider the best interests of the
HMO's enrollees.49 Attorney General Hatch stated, "[B]ecause it di-
rectly owns [hospitals], the primary corporate responsibility of Allina
Health System is to assure the prudent and safe operation of these
hospitals . . . ."50 This assessment was grounded in the Minnesota
statute that describes the mission for hospitals (and other patient care
entities) as, essentially, the institutional care of human beings. 5 1 On
the other hand, Attorney General Hatch stated that Medica had a
"clear statutory mission" to "manage health care costs and try to keep
premiums down." 52 This conclusion derived from the Minnesota ena-
bling statute for HMOs, which was created in 1973, presumably pur-
suant to the mandate of the federal HMO Act of 1973.53 The
Minnesota HMO statutory language reflects findings made by the fed-
eral government that HMOs were more efficient and therefore eco-
nomically more sound than traditional indemnity insurance.5 4 In
light of the HMO statutory mission, Attorney General Hatch con-
cluded that Medica's mission conflicted with Allina's mission to ensure
that the patient care side of its organizations were "adequately capi-
talized and financed to serve the needs of patients."55 In other words,
Medica had to create economic efficiencies (pay less) while Allina had
care policies while Allina Hospitals clearly made money on the treatment of Medi-
care patients." Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
49. See id. § 2.21, at 33-34.
50. See id. § 2.2, at 2.
51. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.50(2) (West 2005). The statute states:
Hospital . . . shall mean any institution, place, building, or agency, in
which any accommodation is maintained, furnished, or offered for five or
more persons for: the hospitalization of the sick or injured; the provision
of care in a swing bed ... ; elective outpatient surgery for preexamined,
prediagnosed low risk patients; emergency medical services offered 24
hours a day, seven days a week, in an ambulatory or outpatient setting
in a facility not a part of a licensed hospital; or the institutional care of
human beings.
Id.
52. COMPLIANCE REVIEW, supra note 29, pt. 2, § 2.4, at 7-8.
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (2000) (originally enacted as the Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, § 2, 87 Stat. 931).
54. The Minnesota statute states:
Faced with a continuation of mounting costs of health care coupled with
its inaccessibility to large segments of the population, the Legislature
has determined that there is a need to explore alternative methods for
the delivery of health care services, with a view toward achieving greater
efficiency and economy in providing these services.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62D.01(2) (West 2005).
55. See COMPLIANCE REVIEW, supra note 29, pt. 2, § 2.5, at 9.
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to increase its income to serve its patients (charge more).5 6 Any action
taken by the board of either entity contrary to the mission of the entity
would therefore, as Attorney General Hatch stated, be a conflict of in-
terest and impermissible as a breach of the duty of loyalty and the
duty of obedience.5 7
While the conclusions that Attorney General Hatch reached are
sound, disappointment arises from the lack of analysis or guiding
principles. The future IDS is left with an example of predecessors'
violations of fiduciary duties without any guiding analysis. While
they may be difficult to separate, no line was drawn between licen-
sure/mission conflicts and corporate/fiduciary duty conflicts.58 For ex-
ample, the Compliance Review crunches the numbers involved in the
pre-funding arrangement, and then concludes: "The officers and direc-
tors of Medica, by permitting Medica to engage in a pre-funding trans-
action with Allina, have compromised their duty of loyalty, of due care
and of obedience to the mission of Medica."59 Ratifying the prepay-
ment plan undoubtedly was a breach of fiduciary duties by the Medica
directors, but an opportunity existed to describe that a breach of the
duty of loyalty occurred because the directors were diverting funds;
and that a breach of the duty of care occurred because the directors
did not obtain the necessary information to determine whether the
funds should be allocated as they were; and a breach of the duty of
obedience occurred because the licensure mission of Medica required
it to ensure that it paid money only for legitimate services while its
corporate mission as a nonprofit prevents private inurement and pri-
vate benefit. Likewise, after painstakingly tracing the complex his-
tory of Allina hospital mergers, Medica's history, corporate
56. See id. § 2.6, at 9. Hatch made the following introductory statement:
[T]he object of a non-profit organization which owns hospital ought to be
to ensure safety and financial stability in its hospitals. The interest of a
nonprofit HMO, however, is presumably to make certain that premiums
are efficiently utilized on behalf of its members for quality health care.
The goals of Medica and Allina have clashed in a variety of ways over the
past several years.
Id. pt. 1, § 1.10, at 22.
57. See id. The conclusion by Attorney General Hatch that the missions of an HMO
and a hospital system are irreconcilable leads to speculation regarding whether a
vertically integrated IDS with interlocking board members could ever exist. If
the statutory mission of a licensed HMO and a licensed hospital, ambulatory care
facility, or nursing home-essentially any patient service-inherently conflict,
then vertical integration that includes the feature of interlocking directorates
would never be appropriate so long as healthcare entities cannot fully merge due
to licensure constraints. In the continuum of the history of integrated delivery
systems, such a conclusion would have been a major milestone.
58. Also, unfortunately, the Compliance Review has statements like, "A more serious
concern is that Medica... [redacting begins]." Id. at 23. One can only imagine
what the more serious concerns might be.
59. Id. pt. 2, § 2.9, at 17.
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governance, and other details of Allina, the finding avows, "Putting it
simply, the mission of the Allina Health System and Medica HMO are
different and at times conflicting."60
Perhaps the conclusory statements were due to the fact that the
duty of obedience is tied to the mission of a healthcare nonprofit,
which is in part dictated by statutory mission, but Attorney General
Hatch did not clarify whether this was the issue or the analysis. An
opportunity was missed to delineate such a distinction, which could
have been significant in the development of the doctrine of fiduciary
duties for healthcare entities. The distinction between corporate mis-
sion and licensure mission is vital for parsing fiduciary duties for di-
rectors on multiple boards. The contours of this idea are discussed
below.
B. The Hospital Chain
Where horizontal integration of healthcare providers occurs, it is
not unusual for systems to be governed either by one umbrella board
of directors or by placing members of each board of directors on the
boards of the other member entities within the system. While vertical
mergers slowed due to failures of the predicted economies of scale and
healthcare delivery, horizontal mergers appear to remain popular,
particularly among hospitals and physician groups.6 1
To imagine the complexities of horizontal integration, suppose that
a hospital chain is formed between two successful suburban hospitals
(Hospital A and Hospital B) and an occasionally struggling urban hos-
pital (Urban Hospital). Each of the hospitals remains a separately in-
corporated, nonprofit, tax-exempt hospital, and the affiliation does not
60. Id. § 2.5, at 9.
61. See Brody, supra note 14, at 939 (discussing the ongoing process of hospital inte-
gration in the context of state interference in mergers and conversions). Allina
furnishes us another example for purposes of exploring overlapping boards.
Before Allina and Medica amalgamated, Allina grew as a horizontally integrated
healthcare system through merging a number of hospitals and then a number of
nursing homes. Allina Health System, as a horizontally integrated system, was
created by a series of mergers that occurred over the course of eleven years. The
system consisted of no fewer than eleven separate legal entities. Each of the hos-
pitals within the system was treated as an unincorporated operating unit of Al-
lina. In deconstructing the structural and ethical problems of Allina, Attorney
General Hatch noted that the horizontal integration was incomplete at the time
of the merger with Medica. The hospitals were described as competing with each
other for patients (or "business"), having decentralized administration, failing to
centralize physicians' services, and being inefficiently lead by "co-leaders." See
COMPLIANCE REVIEW, supra note 29, pt. 2, § 2.2, at 2-4; see also Robert S.
Huckman, Hospital Integration and Vertical Consolidation: An Analysis of Acqui-
sitions in New York State, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
11,379, 2005), available for purchase at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl1379.pdf
(noting the significant number of hospital consolidations and integrations over
the past two decades).
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necessitate a modification of the nonprofit mission set forth in each
hospital's articles of incorporation. To ensure a unity of purpose, the
members of the boards of directors begin to serve on the board of at
least one other board in the system, though no umbrella board is
formed. So, the system would appear as follows:
Urban Hospital Suburban Hospital A Suburban Hospital B
Board Members: Board Members: Board Members:
A, B, I, J, K, L, M A, B, C, D, E, F E, F, G, H, I, J
As a result of the merger, the controlling board members are able
to move the entire neurosurgery department to Hospital A, and the
neurosurgeons have relocated their offices to Hospital A to centralize
this set of highly specialized and highly lucrative services. A cardio-
thoracic center of excellence is created at Hospital B, which will re-
quire the sub-specialized cardiac physicians from Urban Hospital and
Hospital A to relocate to Hospital B. Though some patients will have
to travel a greater distance to obtain these specialized services, the
consolidation enables the hospitals to create true depth and expertise
in neurology and cardiology, facilitating optimal levels of office and
operating room experience, creating the foundation for research, and
serving the system's larger community with services that are im-
proved from a quality and a cost perspective. Other specialized ser-
vices are moved around as well, but each hospital maintains the basic
services required to be deemed a general hospital, including an emer-
gency room.
Seemingly as a result of the affiliation and the attendant shifting
of services, Urban Hospital starts to lose money on an annual basis.
The other hospitals in the system are financially stable, and Hospital
A is turning a comfortable profit due to the increase in neurosurgery.
The board of directors of Urban Hospital holds a meeting specifically
to discuss the deficit that Urban Hospital is carrying. The members of
the board decide that it is in the best interest of the integrated deliv-
ery system to contribute fifty percent of the profits of each hospital to
Urban Hospital until a new business plan can be found and instituted
for Urban Hospital. In this way, Urban Hospital can continue to treat
the two populations that rely on it the most, charity care patients who
use the emergency room in a clinic capacity, and trauma patients who
are seen first in the emergency room of Urban Hospital but who may,
upon stabilization, be referred to Hospital A or Hospital B for ad-
vanced or continuing care.
The suburban hospital board members are potentially breaching
their fiduciary duties (namely duty of loyalty) to the Hospital A and
Hospital B simply by supporting Urban Hospital. The board members
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from Urban Hospital, sitting on the boards of Hospital A and Hospital
B, are breaching fiduciary duties (namely duty of care) that they owe
to their hospital if too much time is taken attending to the needs of the
suburban hospitals. While it is doubtful that the board members of
Hospitals A and B would be found to violate the duty of care (the pro-
cedure by which they reach the decision to support Urban Hospital
seems reasoned and informed), it is highly probable that they are vio-
lating their duty of loyalty to Hospital A and Hospital B by shifting
funds to Urban Hospital. It is also possible that the duty of obedience
is being breached if the statutory mandate of each separately incorpo-
rated hospital requires that profits be used to further the charitable
purpose of that particular nonprofit organization.
On the other hand, from a licensure perspective, the missions of
the hospitals would be nearly, if not totally, identical. In this case, the
generic overarching mission of a hospital, to ensure that care is pro-
vided to everyone in the community and that it is adequately funded,
is met. It is then possible that the duty of obedience is not breached
while the duty of loyalty is called into question. As a policy matter,
the public is served by supporting and maintaining Urban Hospital,
both in terms of public health and in terms of the public fisc (the more
Urban Hospital is supported by the system hospitals, the less it must
be supported by charity care reimbursement and other funds that de-
rive from taxpayer dollars). We can see that traditional definitions of
fiduciary duties do not serve the board members, or the communities
their organizations support, very well.
C. The Small Town Joint Venture
The third example is a smaller, community-based hospital
(Hometown Hospital) and a home health agency (HHA) that share
board members. Hometown Hospital treats a large number of elderly
patients, and it is a major source of referrals for HHA. The nurses at
Hometown Hospital are specifically trained in the criteria for receiv-
ing reimbursement for home health services, and some of them are
independent contractors who also work for the home health agency.
As is common in rural and smaller communities, Hometown Hospital
and HHA work together to ensure that qualifying patients are fun-
neled to HHA. The boards contain overlapping members because the
community lacks volunteers and because it keeps business flowing
well; everyone is satisfied with the arrangement.
HHA reevaluates its business plan and decides that it should serve
the competing hospital in the neighboring town (Neighbor Hospital) in
order to stay financially healthy; reimbursement rates are not what
they used to be. HHA commences discussions with Neighbor Hospital
to place nurses at the hospital a few days per week. HHA does not
want to alert Hometown Hospital of its new enterprise for fear of los-
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ing patient referrals from Hometown Hospital. HHA believes
Hometown Hospital will be concerned that HHA may not be serving
its patients as thoroughly as it could be and may be concerned that
HHA is diverting patients to Neighbor Hospital when opportunities
arise.
Board members who sit on both boards, upon learning of the rela-
tionship with Neighbor Hospital, will suffer from divided loyalties at
the least. Though no usurpation of corporate opportunity is occurring
by a member of the board-the traditional definition of a conflict of
interest-any board member who sits on both boards now has infor-
mation that is detrimental to Hometown Hospital if it is not revealed
and detrimental to HHA if it is revealed. The small town operation
has a dissimilar feel from the large healthcare systems; we may have
different expectations for rural and small-time entities, but courts ex-
pect the directors to execute their fiduciary duties with the same level
of care, loyalty, and obedience. The conundrum is clear; and, what-
ever the directors do, the mere possession of information is outside the
usual bounds of courts' analysis of the duty of loyalty.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES-TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE,
MODERN SHORTCOMINGS
The notion of fiduciary duties stems from both charitable trust and
corporate law principles and extends to the nonprofit corporate sector
in distinctive ways. Although the actions of nonprofit boards of direc-
tors have been granted more than the usual amount of deference by
courts because members generally serve unpaid, the conduct of non-
profit boards of directors is governed by standards substantially simi-
lar to those that govern for-profit organizations. 6 2 In no small part,
this parallel is due to the principles set forth in the Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act.63 Unlike for-profit corporate directors,
however, nonprofit directors owe fiduciary duties to both the corpora-
tion and the public.64 Thus, we see that nonprofit directors must ad-
here to the two most familiar fiduciary duties, the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty, but directors of nonprofit corporations have been held
recently to a third duty, the duty of obedience. The duty of obedience
is tied to the public benefit aspect of nonprofit status that is particu-
larly important for healthcare entities. 65
62. See RMNCA, supra note 12, § 8.30.
63. See id.
64. See HOWARD L. OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIA-
TIONS 265 (5th ed. 1988).
65. See Naomi Ono, Boards of Directors Under Fire: An Examination of Nonprofit
Board Duties in the Health Care Environment, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 108
(1998); DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 84
(1988).
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A. The Duties Reviewed
Black's Law Dictionary defines the doctrine of fiduciary duties as:
"A duty to act for someone else's benefit, while subordinating one's
personal interest to that of the other person. It is the highest standard
of duty implied by law (e.g., trustee, guardian)."66 Healthcare non-
profits experience a greater imbalance of power than other nonprofits
due to the nature of the provision of healthcare and lack of medical
knowledge of the typical beneficiary of a healthcare nonprofit, the pa-
tient.6 7 That directors have so much responsibility, and so little over-
sight, is of concern to many and helps to explain the need for greater
recognition of the duty of obedience, which is discussed below and ad-
dressed by suggestions in this Article. 6 8
1. The Duty of Care
The duty of care requires directors to act in an informed, careful
manner and to affirmatively protect the interests of their organiza-
tion. 69 This is traditionally framed by asking whether directors have
(1) acted in good faith; (2) with the degree of diligence, care and skill
that ordinary, prudent persons would exercise in like circumstances;
and (3) in the best interests of the corporation. 70 Thus, the duty of
care refers to the way in which directors arrive at decisions made on
behalf of the corporation, not the validity or soundness of the decisions
themselves.71 A court reviewing an alleged breach of the duty will
consider process, not substance.
Directors who have met the elements of the duty of care are gener-
ally protected from personal liability by courts under the business
judgment rule,72 which shields directors from judicial scrutiny when
they act reasonably and in an informed manner on behalf of the corpo-
66. BLAcsS LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
67. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,
862 (1980) (discussing the problem of the contract analogy for nonprofits that
provide complex personal services).
68. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Of-
ficers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 632-33
(1998) (observing that many nonprofits have directors who are no more than
"window dressing" and that ineffective governance hinders the ability of nonprof-
its to carry out their missions).
69. See KURTZ, supra note 65, at 22-30 (exploring the meaning and contours of the
duty of care).
70. See Comm. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT COR-
PORATIONS, 19 (George W. Overton & Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 2d. ed. 2002)
[hereinafter GUIDEBOOK]. The third element overlaps with the duty of loyalty
and is not always described as a required element of the duty of care.
71. See Fishman, supra note 7, at 232 (discussing the meaning of the duty of care).
72. See KURTZ, supra note 65, at 49 (discussing the nature of the business judgment
rule). Fishman calls this the "best judgment rule" in the nonprofit setting. See
Fishman, supra note 7, at 233.
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ration.7 3 Though anecdotal evidence indicates that the business judg-
ment rule is applied less frequently to the directors of nonprofit
corporations, it can still protect them from liability for bad out-
comes. 74 An outstanding question is whether state attorneys general
will apply the business judgment rule when exercising their oversight
of nonprofits.7 5
2. The Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty commonly is described as requiring directors to
act without self-interest, in good faith, and in the best interests of the
corporation that they serve, at all times.76 This entails both an af-
firmative duty to protect the interests of the corporation and an obli-
gation to refrain from conduct that would injure the corporation. 7 7
The duty of loyalty derives from state statutory law, the Revised
73. See KURTZ, supra note 65, at 49-51 (discussing the doctrine of the business judg-
ment rule).
74. Some believe directors of nonprofits need the protection of the business judgment
rule less than the directors of for-profit corporations because courts are tradition-
ally lenient with nonprofit directors due to the voluntary nature of their service.
See id. at 50. Kurtz notes,
Is there a suitable alternative need or justification for the rule for non-
profits and, if so, when should it be applied? To some extent, that justifi-
cation may be found in the uncompensated nature of the service of the
typical nonprofit director, whom courts are reluctant to hold to too exact-
ing a standard of conduct.
Id. Note that the business judgment rule never applies to breaches of the duty of
loyalty. See id. at 49-50; see also Lawrence E. Singer, The Conversion Conun-
drum: The State and Federal Response to Hospitals' Changes in Charitable Sta-
tus, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 235 (1997). Singer notes that generally the decisions
of the directors of nonprofits are protected by the business judgment rule, but the
rule offers no shield where self-dealing is alleged; as a corollary, plaintiffs who
breach claims for breaches of fiduciary duties are most successful when the duty
of loyalty is implicated. See id.
75. See MD. INS. ADMIN., LEGISLATIVE REPORT OF THE MARYLAND INSURANCE ADMINIS-
TRATION ON MIA ORDER No. 2003-02-032, at 111 (2003), http://www.mdin-
surance.state.md.us/documents/LegislativeCareFirstReport07-03.pdf (reporting
that the Maryland Commissioner of Insurance deliberately ignored the business
judgment rule in order to investigate and prevent the proposed conversion of
CareFirst, the sole member of Blue Cross Blue Shield in Maryland, Delaware,
and Washington, D.C.). The commissioner unequivocally stated that the busi-
ness judgment rule had "no place" in the regulatory proceeding. Id. at 71-72.
76. See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 70, at 29. Under the duty of loyalty, nonprofit direc-
tors are required "to exercise their powers in good faith and in the best interests
of the corporation." Id.
77. See id. (stating that the duty of loyalty contains the negative principle that "[t]he
director shall not use a corporate position for individual personal advantage"); see
also JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHwARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 200 (1995).
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Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, case law, and occasionally from In-
ternal Revenue Service rulings and interpretations. 78
Breaches of the duty of loyalty arise when a director has a conflict
of interest, which traditionally has been deemed to occur in three situ-
ations. In the first, a director has interests on both sides of a transac-
tion and could experience personal monetary gain if the transaction
were approved. 79 In the second, the director appropriates a corporate
opportunity without notifying the board or management of the exis-
tence of the opportunity, thus usurping potential financial reward for
the corporation.8 0 A third breach of the duty of loyalty occurs when a
director provides an economic benefit for a third party, even if the
third party is another nonprofit organization. 8 1
The key to each of the three traditional breaches is that the direc-
tor is using the corporation for monetary benefit, which would be a
particular problem for nonprofit corporations due to their corporate
nonprofit purpose.8 2 Using the nonprofit for personal gain is contrary
not only to the general nonprofit corporate standards but also violates
the public trust placed in nonprofits. In modern healthcare, however,
breaches of the duty of loyalty can also occur when a director makes a
decision that is detrimental to the welfare of one corporation to benefit
another-a control (as opposed to monetary) situation that is not con-
templated by traditional duty of loyalty doctrine.
When nonprofit directors encounter situations in which a conflict
of interest could arise, the duty of loyalty has been interpreted to com-
mand that the conflicted director "act with candor and care."8 3 The
permissibility of a nonprofit corporation undertaking a conflicted
transaction, then, is dependent on the manner in which the director
handles the conflict.8 4 Although conflict of interest transactions indi-
cate a breach of the director's duty of loyalty, conflicted transactions
are not automatically void, despite that breach of fiduciary duty.8 5 To
78. See Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1583 (describing the different ar-
eas of the law that affect nonprofit corporations and noting that nonprofits are
subject to and benefit from the tax-exempt regulatory regime).
79. See KURTZ, supra note 65, at 59.
80. See id. A corporate opportunity has been appropriated when a director uses his
position to capitalize on a business opportunity that more properly belongs to the
organization. See Ono, supra note 65, at 115 n.56 (citing Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503,
510 (Del. 1939)).
81. See KURTZ, supra note 65, at 59.
82. This constraint is honored in the duty of obedience. See infra subsection III.A.3.
83. See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 70, at 30.
84. Id. Trustees of charitable trusts may not engage in self-dealing or conflicted
transactions, ever. See John G. Simon, The Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organi-
zations: A Review of Federal and State Policies, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra
note 5, at 67, 89.
85. See RMNCA, supra note 12, § 8.31. The commentary notes that the drafters of
the RMNCA rejected the trustee standard. See id. cmt. pt. 1. In the case of a
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prevent the nullification of a conflicted deal, the corporation must be
able to demonstrate that (1) the challenged transaction "was approved
by a disinterested majority of the board ... after full disclosure by the
affected director of the material facts regarding the transaction and
the director's interest therein," or (2) the challenged transaction "was
fair to the corporation at the time it was entered into."86 Prior to be-
coming involved in a transaction that may provide a corporate oppor-
tunity to an organization, directors have usually been instructed that
they should disclose the facts surrounding the transaction to the board
of directors "in sufficient detail and in adequate time to enable the
board to act or decline to act" with regard to the questionable transac-
tion.8 7 Thus, nonprofit directors are obligated to make objective deci-
sions for the corporations that they serve and must either refrain from
or obtain approval for entering into transactions where objectivity
may be compromised.8 8
The expectation that directors will intuitively know when "in ade-
quate time" occurs and what constitutes "sufficient detail" is unrea-
sonable (for both for-profits and nonprofits), as is the notion that
fiduciaries should simply know how to interpret conflicts with little to
no guidance. The focus on a particular transaction and its monetary
implications is perplexing, as the per-transaction standard leaves di-
rectors with no principled direction, particularly when they serve mul-
tiple boards or when they serve mirror boards (i.e., boards that
contain the same directors). Strictly speaking, a director is automati-
cally violating the duty of loyalty by serving more than one board be-
cause the duty requires the director to act in the best interest of the
corporation at all times. Tension immediately arises from the service
of multiple boards, and under the traditional rule directors sitting on
mirror boards could never consummate a conflicted transaction, which
would result in complete inertia.
3. The Duty of Obedience
The doctrine of fiduciary duties has been expanded in the nonprofit
context, at least by a handful of courts, to include a new duty that is
key to this discussion: the duty of obedience.8 9 This duty directs board
trust, if a fiduciary enters into a transaction and fails "to fully disclose all perti-
nent circumstances, or if the transaction is unfair to the other," courts can nullify
the transaction. Fishman, supra note 7, at 228.
86. See GuIDEBOOK, supra note 70, at 31.
87. See id. at 34.
88. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 200.
89. The following summarizes the states that have adopted the duty of obedience for
nonprofit directors either by common law or statute (though not always in the
healthcare context): California has interpreted the duty of obedience strictly. See
Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Ct. App. 1977). New York,
too, has taken a strict view of the duty of obedience. See MEETH, 715 N.Y.S.2d
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members to ensure allegiance to the entity's charitable mission and to
obey all laws relevant to the organization. 90 While the duty of obedi-
ence was once subsumed within the duty of care for nonprofit corpora-
tions (a holdover from borrowing general corporate law principles),
some courts have recognized it as a distinct fiduciary duty for non-
profit board members. 9 1 In order to understand this duty, it is helpful
to describe how healthcare nonprofits' missions are formulated. To fa-
cilitate the discussion herein, I have separated the discussion into
what I call charter mission and licensure mission.
a. Charter Mission
The corporate purpose of a nonprofit corporation is stated in its
articles of incorporation (also called the corporate charter) and in its
bylaws. The corporate purpose stated in the charter is dictated in part
by state statute, meaning the reasons that a state's nonprofit act al-
lows an entity to be organized as a nonprofit corporation and to re-
ceive state non-taxable status. 92 In addition, the application for the
corporation's federal tax-exempt status may contain a more specific
description of the organization's nonprofit goals. 93 Corporate purpose
is particularly important for nonprofit organizations, as they can only
incorporate for the permitted reasons delineated in the incorporating
state's nonprofit corporation statute. Failure to so organize, or failure
to so operate, can remove the state's imprimatur to operate as a non-
profit corporation. The corporation would lose tax-free status at the
state level, and perhaps be forced to return profits to the state that
575 (Sup. Ct. 1999); see also Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. New York, 840
N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 2005). Other states have afforded nonprofit directors more flexi-
bility in fulfilling their missions: Missouri is one example, see Taylor v. Baldwin,
247 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1952); New Jersey is another, see City of Paterson v. Pater-
son Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967). Other states are on
the cusp; for instance, in Georgia the duty has been recognized in a dissenting
opinion. See Shorter Coll. v. Baptist Convention of Ga., 614 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. 2005).
90. See MEETH, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
91. See Goldschmid, supra note 68, at 641 (acknowledging the analytical reasons for
separating duty of care and duty of obedience but choosing to subsume duty of
obedience within the duty of care for purposes of for-profit analog analysis).
Some courts have described the duty of obedience as part of the duty of loyalty.
For example, the court in Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Service, 112
S.W.3d 486, 504 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), stated that a "director's duty of loyalty
lies in pursuing or ensuring pursuit of the charitable purpose or public benefit
which is the mission of the corporation." Some consider the duty of obedience to
be a partnership principle that derives from the agency relationship of partners;
when partners decide on a course of action for the partnership, each partner had
a "duty of obedience" to carry out that decision. See, e.g., 7 CHARLES W. MUR-
DOCK, ILLINOIS PRACTICE: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 3.17A (2006) (describing the
fiduciary duty of each partner to facilitate the chosen action).
92. See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 70, at 6.
93. See KURTZ, supra note 65, at 85.
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would have been collected from a for-profit organization, which could
result in loss of federal tax-exempt status (most likely under
§ 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code for a healthcare provider).
State nonprofit statutes tend to list cursorily the possible purposes
for which a nonprofit may be incorporated, and the list usually in-
cludes such purposes as educational, religious, charitable, eleemosy-
nary, and fraternal; healthcare is generally considered to be a
"charitable" activity and tends not to be listed separately.9 4 The ab-
sence of healthcare in most nonprofit statutes forces incorporators of
healthcare nonprofits to rely on historical statements of nonprofit cor-
porate purpose for other healthcare entities' charter missions.
From the state's perspective, it is important for healthcare non-
profits to adhere to their corporate purpose so that the state can easily
determine that ongoing tax-exempt status is warranted. From the en-
tity's perspective, being true to corporate purpose can facilitate con-
stancy and continuity for the typical revolving door of board members,
officers, and employees. Notably, different healthcare nonprofits may
have very similar charter missions; for example, two general hospitals
incorporated in the same state are likely to have the same charter
mission.
b. Licensure Mission
The mission of a healthcare entity also derives from its license to
provide healthcare; I call this licensure mission. Consistent with the
highly regulated nature of healthcare, every healthcare provider must
be licensed to provide the services of that type of institution in each
state in which the services are offered. For instance, a hospital must
be licensed under department of health rules in the state(s) in which
the hospital provides services. Licensure mission, therefore, is the in-
tended healthcare purpose of the organization as dictated by the statu-
tory and regulatory schemes that create the licensure of the entity.
Licensure mission is unlike charter mission in a few respects.
First, jurisdictionally, the statutory schemes are distinct in creation
94. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273.167 (West 2005). In typical fashion, section
273.167 states:
Corporations may be organized under KRS 273.161 to 273.390 for any
lawful purpose or purposes, including, without being limited to, any one
or more of the following purposes: charitable; benevolent; eleemosynary;
educational; civic; patriotic; political; governmental; religious; social; rec-
reational; fraternal; literary; cultural; athletic; scientific; agricultural;
horticultural; animal husbandry; and professional, commercial, indus-
trial or trade association; but labor unions, cooperative organizations,
and organizations subject to any of the provisions of the insurance laws
or banking laws of this state may not be organized under KRS 273.161 to
273.390.
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and in enforcement. Corporate charters are overseen by state depart-
ments of treasury, while licensure of healthcare entities is performed
by state departments of health. Second, each serves a separate pur-
pose and defines the corporation differently. Charter mission explains
the type of special corporation, but licensure mission defines the ser-
vices provided to the community. Third, the enforcement of the two
missions is accomplished by different means and with different goals
in mind. Though both ultimately serve the community, adherence to
charter mission could be described as a furtherance of fiscal trust,
while adherence to licensure mission could be described as adherence
to medical standards and purposes. The two missions overlap, but
they are established by dissimilar means. Perhaps more than non-
profit charter mission, the licensure mission could help to guide direc-
tors in their service to the organization and its community.
c. Mission Interpretation
Traditionally directors have been granted considerable latitude in
interpreting broadly stated objectives for their nonprofit corporations.
However, a few courts have interpreted the duty of obedience as
charging directors with adhering to the charter's stated objectives,
even if alternatives exist that directors believe may be better for the
corporation and/or necessary for the served community. 9 5 This doc-
trine and its consequences illuminate a major difference between non-
profits and general corporations, and it is worth restating: Nonprofits
can exist only for a purpose specified by the relevant state nonprofit
corporation act, which must be mentioned in the entity's articles of
incorporation.96 If the nonprofit neglects its declared purpose(s), then
theoretically the nonprofit must cease operations or become a for-
profit corporation and divest a portion of its past profits.9 7
The duty of obedience is strikingly similar to a trustee's duty to
administer a trust in a manner that is consistent with the wishes of
the trust's creator, as it requires that directors maintain and promote
the corporation's charitable or public interest purpose. 98 The obvious
95. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 509
(3d ed. 1997); see also MEETH, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 591, 593, 595. Note, however,
that a nonprofit board may modify the fundamental objectives of an organization
if it amends its articles of formation and its bylaws, and if it notifies the appropri-
ate state officials. See RMNCA, supra note 12, §§ 10.01-.02, 10.05.
96. See Fishman, supra note 7, at 237 (stating that directors have in the duty of
obedience a responsibility that resembles trustees' duty to administer the trust in
the manner proscribed by the trust's creator because the directors of a nonprofit
must adhere to the purposes for which the nonprofit was created).
97. See generally Greaney & Boozang, supra note 14 (discussing the lengths to which
state attorneys general have gone in pursuit of recompense when nonprofit
healthcare organizations convert).
98. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 95, at 508-09.
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difference is that the creator of the trust in this case is the state,
which has decided the permissible objectives for nonprofit corpora-
tions and their state tax-exempt status. States then allow the trust
that is the nonprofit corporation to self-administer its charitable
goals, often with little more guidance than to obey the corporate
mission.
The rationale of the duty of obedience stems from the notion that
nonprofit corporations are characterized by their specific, state-sanc-
tioned objectives, but they may not be driven by desire to generate a
profit. 99 Additional justification for the duty grows from the idea that
donations to nonprofit corporations "are made in reliance upon the ful-
fillment of those charitable purposes."OO The duty of obedience also
reflects an underlying reality that the ability to utilize private funds is
contingent on the confidence that donors have in the honesty of those
ultimately accountable for managing them.lO1 With this background,
some courts have rejected any shift of corporate resources to other
objectives, despite the seeming merit of those other objectives.1o 2
Though it is difficult to discuss the duty of obedience without visit-
ing Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital v. Spitzer [hereinafter
MEETH], the proverbial jury is still out on whether this case will be-
come paradigmatic or atypical.1o3 In MEETH, a financially strapped
hospital sought authorization from the New York State Attorney Gen-
eral, Eliot Spitzer, to sell a substantial portion of its assets to a cancer
99. See PEREGRINE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 3-4 (discussing the fundamental
differences between for-profit and nonprofit organizations).
100. See KURTZ, supra note 65, at 85 (quoting Trs. of Rutgers Coll. v. Richman, 125
A.2d 10, 26 (N.J. 1956)).
101. Id. at 85.
102. See, e.g., MEETH, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1999). MEETH could be atypical
because very little case law exists yet regarding the duty of obedience, and be-
cause another New York court interpreted the attorney general's power under
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAw §§ 510, 511 (McKinney 2006), quite differently.
See Nathan Littauer Hosp. Ass'n v. Spitzer, 734 N.Y.S.2d 671 (App. Div. 2001).
Littauer is different in important ways, including that the court found the pro-
posed transaction did not fall within the statutory requirement for court review
and notice to the attorney general because affiliation via a newly formed parent
corporation merely involved restating the certificate of incorporation. See id. at
674-75.
103. See MEETH, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 576-77. Few cases exist to serve as examples for
interpreting and understanding the duty of obedience to date, though New York
is emerging as a bit of a hotbed of the duty's doctrine given the state's statutory
framework and the activity of then-Attorney General Spitzer. See, e.g., Consum-
ers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State of New York, 840 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 2005), in which
the conversion of Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield was challenged by a con-
sumer group on a variety of grounds, including violation of the duty of obedience;
like MEETH, the state attorney general had jurisdiction because of statutory sec-
tion 511. Now that Mr. Spitzer is New York's governor, it will be interesting to
watch his successor's direction.
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center and a real estate developer. lo4 The authorization arguably was
obligatory under the terms of section 511 of New York's Not-for-Profit
Corporation Law, which requires that a New York court determine
whether transactions are fair and reasonable to the not-for-profit cor-
poration and promote the objectives of the organization.10 5 Attorney
General Spitzer determined that the sale would have altered the mis-
sion of MEETH by incorporating "unstudied and unevaluated charita-
ble purposes" into the original mission.'0 6 As a result, Spitzer
objected to MEETH's petition, asserting that MEETH accepted the of-
fers without considering other possibilities that potentially would
have advanced the original objectives of MEETH.107 The court held
that MEETH failed to meet both prongs of the section 511 test not
only because the terms of the transaction failed to account for
MEETH's value as a going concern and for the value of the good will in
MEETH's name, but also because the directors failed to demonstrate
that the sale would promote the founding, declared purposes of the
organization. 108
In discussing the duty of obedience, the MEETH court declared
that nonprofit directors must remain faithful to the purposes and
objectives of the organization they serve.' 0 9 The court observed that
in limited cases financial difficulties may necessitate the sale of an
organization's assets and the assumption of a new mission, but the
duty of obedience requires the directors to first and foremost preserve
the organization's original mission.110 Ultimately the court held that
a sale will not be approved for a nonprofit corporation if it fails to pro-
mote the purposes of the corporation (and indicates the advancement
of a new mission) when no reasoned determination proves that the
original mission could not be continued."'
MEETH exhibits the heightened interest in the concept of the duty
of obedience. If enforced, this duty can act as a rein on board activi-
ties, but the more important issue is whether board members appreci-
ate what it means to adhere to their own statutory mission, and how
license-based mission can expound on the statutory mission of a
healthcare nonprofit. More than the duty of loyalty, the duty of obedi-
ence may help to refine doctrine surrounding conflicts of interest.
104. See MEETH, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 577-78.
105. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 511 (McKinney 2006).
106. See MEETH, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
107. Id. at 588. The failure to evaluate the deal properly was a breakdown of the duty
of care; non-adherence to mission was a failure of the duty of obedience.
108. Id. at 597.
109. Id. at 593.
110. Id. at 595-96.
111. Id. at 597.
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B. The Void of Guidance
"What is unclear, however, is what nonprofit boards are actually
supposed to do."112 Directors in modern healthcare nonprofits fre-
quently serve more than one board, yet no authority addresses this
common occurrence, making it difficult for directors to fulfill fiduciary
obligations. 113 The case law that does exist rarely if ever addresses
broader principles of loyalty or obedience.114 Other sources of author-
ity, such as the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporations Act,115 fail to
provide adequate information, even in explanatory comments.
1. Case Law, by Example
Nonprofit corporations have generated case law that is discombob-
ulated at best.116 The lack of consistent standards by which to under-
stand the fiduciary duties of boards of directors is confused by courts'
inability to determine whether the corporate standard or the charita-
ble-trust standard is persuasive. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National
Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries117 serves as a cogent
example. Also, extant guidance is retroactive and generally too cir-
cumstance specific to guide directors in future actions in a meaningful
way; MEETH is an example of this problem.11s
Stern involved breaches of the duty of care and duty of loyalty by
the board of a hospital. Before determining whether fiduciary duties
were breached, the court had to determine which standard to use:
charitable trust or general corporate. This was particularly an issue
because the first version of the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act did
not adopt fiduciary duties for nonprofit board members. 119 Because
the trouble in Stern was failure to manage (rather than mismanage-
ment), the directors would have breached their duty of care regardless
of the standard applied.120 Nevertheless, Stern helped to establish
112. Goldschmid, supra note 68, at 639.
113. See Fishman, supra note 7, at 243-44. The author notes that the laws regarding
the responsibilities of fiduciaries are "abstract and offer little concrete guidance."
114. See Wells, supra note 4, at 563.
115. See supra note 12.
116. See Thomas H. Boyd, A Call to Reform the Duties of Directors Under State Not-
for-Profit Corporation Statutes, 72 IowA L. REV. 725, 732-33 (1987). Boyd notes
that "[a] pplication of various standards to directors of not-for-profit corporations
has resulted in a confusing body of case law, ... a court applied different stan-
dards to the same institution [in one case]." Id.
117. See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missiona-
ries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974).
118. See MEETH, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
119. See Stern, 381 F. Supp. at 1013 (noting that charitable corporations are a rela-
tively new creature but that most courts had been utilizing general corporate
standards).
120. As the court noted, "Total abdication of the supervisory role.., is improper even
under traditional corporate principles." Id. at 1014.
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that nonprofit directors can be held liable for "gross negligence" when
their mismanagement leads to corporate losses. 12 1
In the context of this discussion, Stern set forth the standard that
the duty of loyalty is breached when a director knowingly permits the
nonprofit organization to enter a business transaction either with
himself or with an entity in which he has a substantial interest with-
out informing the board of his interest and then withdrawing from a
vote on the transaction.12 2 Dicta of the Stern court is remarkable for
not having been followed despite its prescience; the court stated that a
director is responsible for ensuring that the directors who are charged
with approving the interested transaction are informed not only of the
conflicted director's interest, but also of any "significant reasons, un-
known to or not fully appreciated by such persons, why the transac-
tion might not be in the best interests" of the healthcare
organization.12 3 The Stern court began to grapple with the impor-
tance of information and the need for uninterested (or unconflicted)
directors to appreciate what might not be in the best interests of the
corporation, even if no usurpation or actual financial conflict exists. 124
More specifically, the Stern court had an opportunity to explore the
idea of a duality of interest, as the hospital had adopted guidelines
promulgated by the American Hospital Association (AHA) that formed
a model conflict of interest policy. In this policy, the AHA explained
that modern hospitals were likely to have board members that exper-
ienced a "duality" of interest or conflict of interest because board mem-
bers were likely to be chosen for their "expertise, their leadership...
in other fields, or their specialized representation of significant com-
munity interests."125 The AHA's ethics advisory document strongly
recommended that such dualities be disclosed and made a "matter of
121. Id. at 1013 (citing 1 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAw AND PRACTICE § 446 (1959)).
122. Id. at 1015-16.
123. Id. at 1015.
124. The full language of the court's standard is as follows:
(2) he knowingly permitted the hospital to enter into a business transac-
tion with himself or with any corporation, partnership or association in
which he then had a substantial interest or held a position as trustee,
director, general manager or principal officer without having previously
informed the persons charged with approving that transaction of his in-
terest or position and of any significant reasons, unknown to or not fully
appreciated by such persons, why the transaction might not be in the best
interests of the hospital; or
(3) except as required by the preceding paragraph, he actively partici-
pated in or voted in favor of a decision by the Board or any committee or
subcommittee thereof to transact business with himself or with any cor-
poration, partnership or association in which he then had a substantial
interest or held a position as trustee, director, general manager or prin-
cipal officer[.l
Id. (emphasis added).
125. AM. Hosp. AsS'N, GUIDELINES FOR RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 1 (1974).
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record through an annual procedure and also when the interest be-
comes a matter of board action."1 26 The AHA recognized that such
dualities could be beneficial for the hospital; however, the Stern court
did not explore the possibilities for expanded discourse of conflicts
presented by the case.
MEETH is also cited as a modern case that hashes out the intrica-
cies of board duties.12 7 As was discussed above, the members of the
board of directors of MEETH were deemed to violate their fiduciary
duties (specifically the duty of care) by accepting an offer for the sale
of the historic Manhattan hospital before investigating options that
would have adhered to the original mission of the hospital.12s The
trouble with MEETH as a discussion of fiduciary duties is at least
threefold. First, the case is founded on a unique state law that re-
quires court approval to sell all or substantially all of the assets of a
not-for-profit corporation. 12 9 New York appears to be virtually alone
in mandating court oversight; most states simply require some form of
notice, often to the state attorney general.130 Second, the case merely
instructs boards of directors on how not to act; the two-pronged test
set forth by the court is an interpretation of a state law that does not
inform boards regarding their future conduct. Third, the New York
statute is a quasi-cy pres scheme that does not contain many direct
analogs. Thus, even the "model" case law for nonprofits does not sig-
nificantly advance understanding of the doctrine of fiduciary duties.
2. The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act
The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA) also fails
to provide directors with a meaningful method of parsing fiduciary du-
ties. In fact, the drafters of the RMNCA appear to have deliberately
narrowed the sections of the act that address conflicts of interest.131
The RMNCA was a complete amendment of the original Model Non-
profit Corporation Act, and the revision was supposed to improve on
the original model act's obvious deficiencies, such as a complete lack of
defining principles for the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.132
126. Stern, 381 F. Supp. at 1015 (citing the hospital's bylaws as adopted from the AHA
guidelines).
127. See MEETH, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
128. See id. at 156-59.
129. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW § 511 (McKinney 2006).
130. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 894 (5th ed. 2004) (commenting on the
duty of obedience and the difference between New York and other states'
standards).
131. See RMNCA, supra note 12, §§ 8.30-.31.
132. See id. at xix. More specifically, the first model nonprofit corporation act "did not
set forth standards of care or loyalty for directors or officers. It did not deal with
statutory immunity or protection for directors who acted with due care and did
not breach their duty of loyalty. Nor did it provide conflict of interest rules." Id.
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While the intent of the drafters of the RMNCA was to include gui-
dance on conflicts of interest, they defined conflicts too narrowly for
the model to be of much use. The drafters decided that fiduciary du-
ties protect the interests of those who make donations to public benefit
corporations so that donors know that their monies will only be used
for the intended public purpose, not for directors' personal benefit. 133
The narrow focus on monetary issues facilitated the narrow scope of
the doctrine as it became codified in state law. The authors of the
RMNCA acknowledged the debate about the appropriate model for
nonprofit corporations (trust versus general corporation), and they
chose the model of a general corporation with "little difficulty."13 4
Thus, the RMNCA describes the duty of care as the same duty that
directors of for-profit corporations owe-the duty of an ordinarily pru-
dent person under like circumstances. 13 5 This provides much in the
way of leeway and little in the way of guidance. Likewise, regarding
the duty of loyalty, the RMNCA states that directors must act in good
faith and in a manner "they reasonably believe to be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation." 13 6 The comment explicitly states that the de-
velopment of standards in the area of the duty of loyalty is left to the
court system. 13 7 As discussed above, this has not occurred, and the
courts have not provided meaningful instruction to directors.
The RMNCA also does not provide advice or standards on the duty
of obedience.' 38 The drafters deliberately left the matter of corporate
purpose to state courts and to the Internal Revenue Service, as they
perceived the matter of corporate purpose as tied to satisfying the re-
quirements of § 501(c)(3).139 At the time it was drafted, the authors of
133. See id. §§ 8.30-.31; id. at xxvi.
134. See id. at xxxv. The RMNCA states as follows:
There has been no consensus on the standards that should be applicable
to director of nonprofit corporations. Some commentators have sug-
gested trust standards, while others have suggested business standards.
The Subcommittee had little difficulty in rejecting trust standards
and adopting the same general language the [Model Business Corpora-
tion Act] uses for directors of business corporations. (citations omitted)).
135. See id. § 8.30(a)(2).
136. Id. § 8.30 cmt. pt. 4. The duty of loyalty standard becomes more confusing with
regard to disposition of property by a nonprofit because the drafters of the
RMNCA left open the possibility that a trust standard would apply. See, e.g., id.
§ 12.02 cmt.
137. See id. § 8.30 cmt. pt. 4 (citing Mile-O-Mo Fishing Club, Inc. v. Noble, 320 N.E.2d
12 (Ill. 1965)).
138. See, e.g., KURTZ, supra note 65. Daniel L. Kurtz, one of the drafters of the
RMNCA, wrote an indispensable book, Board Liability: Guide for Nonprofit Di-
rectors, that was published a year after the RMNCA. Board Liability has become
an important resource for understanding the contours of the duty of obedience.
One must wonder why Kurtz did not push to introduce the duty of obedience into
the RMNCA while working on the drafts. Since the Board Liability project began
sometime in 1984, the two projects surely overlapped.
139. See RMCNA, supra note 12, at xxiii.
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the RMNCA found it sufficient to delineate what constitutes a conflict
of interest transaction and to provide for attorney general oversight to
prevent abuses by directors of public benefit nonprofit corporations. 140
Times have changed, though, and the RMNCA has become outdated.
IV. THE FOR-PROFIT CORPORATE APPROACH IS
INSUFFICIENT FOR THE NONPROFIT
HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATION
For-profit general corporations have been utilizing the "inform and
recuse" method codified by Delaware statutory section 144 for many
years.1 4 ' Essentially this method requires the conflicted director to
reveal the existence of the conflict and then to remove herself from
voting on the issue. This approach is deemed to remove the "taint"
from the transaction, and thereby courts apply the business judgment
rule to the decisionmaking of the nonconflicted directors and ignore
any conflicts that would otherwise void a transaction. The subtext to
this approach is that the directors will not be faced with the scenario
that healthcare nonprofits face-the inevitability of repetition, which
may be unique to healthcare nonprofits due to the need to adhere to
charter mission and licensure mission. Further, directors in the for-
profit sector, especially in publicly held corporations, are subject to a
variety of controls that simply do not exist for nonprofit
organizations. 142
140. See id. at xxviii.
141. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2005) ("(a) No contract or transaction between a
corporation and 1 or more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and
any other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which 1
or more of its directors or officers, are directors or officers, or have a financial
interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the
director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of the board or com-
mittee which authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because any such
director's or officer's votes are counted for such purpose, if: (1) The material facts
as to the director's or officer's relationship or interest and as to the contract or
transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the committee,
and the board or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction
by the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though
the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or (2) The material facts as to
the director's or officer's relationship or interest and as to the contract or transac-
tion are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and
the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the
shareholders; or (3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of
the time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a commit-
tee or the shareholders. (b) Common or interested directors may be counted in
determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or of
a committee which authorizes the contract or transaction.").
142. See Goldschmid, supra note 68, at 636 (discussing a series of occurrences in the
1990s that made the boards of for-profit entities more responsible and
responsive).
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General business corporations are "an instrument through which
capital is assembled for the activities of producing and distributing
goods and services and making investments .... with a view to en-
hancing corporate profit and shareholder gain."' 4 3 While the mission
of a nonprofit is its foundation and raison d'etre, the mission of a for-
profit is simply to earn money for the continuing success of the corpo-
ration and the happiness of its shareholders.144 Setting aside health-
care purpose momentarily, for-profits and nonprofits can be
differentiated easily by the financial imperative and the markets in
which general corporations operate.14 5 For-profit entities are subject
to different restrictions than nonprofits, particularly if they are pub-
licly traded. Also, for-profits have markets in which they must com-
pete, and they have shareholders, each of which exert some degree of
control over the purpose of the for-profit.146 For-profits' charters state
typically they are formed "for any lawful purpose," or (bluntly) any
lawful method to prosper for shareholders; they are not restricted by
notions of mission.14 7 In the general corporate sector, entities tend to
merge and/or otherwise transact in such a way that the matter for
which the conflict exists is unlikely to arise again, even if directorates
overlap. 148
143. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01
cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1984).
144. See 1 HEALTH LAw PRACTICE GUIDE § 6:47.1 (Am. Health Lawyers Ass'n 2003).
The Health Law Practice Guide notes, "[Ilt must be remembered that the duty to
members of a charitable organization is not to maximize profits (as in the case of
a for-profit corporation) but instead to advance the organization's charitable pur-
pose)." Id.
145. In hospital markets, for-profit and nonprofit organizations may directly compete.
Also, in a horizontal integration, it is sometimes possible for hospitals to merge
rather than affiliate by contract and overlap.
146. See Goldschmid, supra note 68, at 637 (noting that nonprofits are not bound by or
protected by shareholder voting in the context of acquisitions).
147. See Peggy Sasso, Searching for Trust in the Not-for-Profit Boardroom: Looking
Beyond the Duty of Obedience to Ensure Accountability, 50 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1485
(2003). Lamenting the omission of the duty of obedience from the RMNCA, the
author states,
[Tihe RMNCA carries its theme of creating symmetry between nonprofit
and for-profit corporate law to an illogical extreme. The two entities
measure accountability by very different standards, with the for-profit
corporation relying on market indicators to assess performance, while
the not-for-profit corporation derives its standard of accountability from
legal and social norms. Presumably the RMNCA assumed the duty of
obedience was adequately addressed through duties of care and loyalty.
Id. at 1522.
148. The exception is a transaction that results in or deals with a wholly-owned or
non-wholly-owned subsidiary, in which case general corporations may face simi-
lar issues to healthcare nonprofits. See, e.g., Anadarko Petrol. Corp. v. Panhan-
dle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988).
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Delaware recognizes that serving in multiple directorates is possi-
ble and that serving more then one board is not per se invalid. 149 Del-
aware courts have acknowledged that it is common for directors to
serve more than one board and that such directors owe the same fidu-
ciary duties to each corporation; neither may dilute the duties owed to
the other. 15 0 The Delaware common law on interested transactions
that once resembled the per se voidability of trusts was invalidated by
the 1967 enactment of section 144.15k Now, to be disqualified under
Delaware law, a director must have a "substantial" interest such that
the director could not make a decision based solely on the corporate
merits of the transaction because she is too influenced by "personal or
extraneous considerations."152 Thus, not only are interested transac-
tions not per se invalid, but the standard by which directors are deter-
mined to be "interested" gives directors great flexibility.
The permissive approach embraced by Delaware for general corpo-
rations is illuminated by Warshaw v. Calhoun, in which the Delaware
Chancery Court determined that "individuals who act in a dual capac-
ity as directors of two corporations, one of whom is parent and the
other subsidiary, owe the same duty of good management to both cor-
porations. This duty is to be exercised in light of what is best for both
corporations."153 The Warshaw court further decided that multiple di-
rectorships, while permissible, are no excuse for not serving each cor-
poration equally in performing the duty of "good management. " 1 5 4 In
absolving the defendants of personal liability, the court relied on the
business judgment rule and the presumption that directors act in the
best interests of the corporations that they serve, even if financial
149. See ERNEST L. FOLK, FOLK ON DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW § 144.10 (1992) ("Inter-
locked boards are 'not in themselves unlawful,' and charter or by-law provisions
that 'merely facilitate[ ] the functioning of the [interlocked] board, cannot be said
to constitute a contract contrary to public policy."' (quoting Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118-19 (Del. 1952))).
150. See Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487 (Del. 1966).
151. See Potter v. Sanitary Co. of Am., 194 A. 87 (Del. Ch. 1937) (strongly condemning
interested-director behavior). Historically, transactions between corporations
having overlapping directors and officers were characterized automatically as
"constructively fraudulent" if no shareholder ratification occurred. See Marciano
v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403 (Del. 1987) (citing Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224,
232 (Del. Ch. 1921)).
152. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993) (citing Progos-
tin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816
(Del. 1984)).
153. Warshaw, 221 A.2d at 492 (citing Abelow v. Midstates Oil Corp., 189 A.2d 675
(Del. 1963)). See also Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d 911, 915 (Del. Ch.
1969) (stating that multiple directorships are not an excuse for diluting fiduciary
duties owed to each corporation; such would be a "turnabout under [Delaware]
law"), rev'd on other grounds, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
154. See Warshaw, 221 A.2d at 487.
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harm comes to a subsidiary corporation or its shareholders.155 The
court relied in part on the assumption that the circumstances giving
rise to the minority shareholder's action were singular and unlikely to
be repeated. 15 6
Healthcare entities, specifically vertically and horizontally inte-
grated entities, are likely to experience the same conflicts recurrently.
As was discussed by example above, an HMO will have the statutorily
mandated mission to manage healthcare costs and to keep premiums
as low as possible, and a hospital will be charged with the statutory
mission of institutional care of humans. Neither mission will be al-
tered absent statutory modification by state legislature. Thus, the di-
rectors who sit on overlapping boards of two such healthcare entities
will be constantly faced with conflicting licensure missions. Also, for-
profit subsidiaries of nonprofit organizations will face similar
problems to the nonprofit; affiliation of nonprofit healthcare entities
creates complications whether the affiliation is nonprofit to nonprofit
or nonprofit to for-profit.
Healthcare nonprofits have no shareholders to oversee their activi-
ties; instead they serve a given community through fulfilling their li-
censure and charter mission, the sine qua non of their existence.
Constant recusal ultimately would mean a failure of overlapping di-
rectors to serve the community; also, recusal would become a farce.
Certain directors (or all directors, in the instance of mirror boards)
would never be able to vote and would ultimately violate the duty of
care in the process of attempting to honor the duty of loyalty. A fresh
approach is needed for healthcare nonprofits with overlapping boards.
V. PROPOSALS FOR PROACTIVE BOARDS
It is important for directors to be able to proactively resolve con-
flicts, but the need for clear guidance for overlapping boards goes be-
yond the avoidance of government interference. Intervention by an
attorney general does nothing to advance norms in board behavior,
the same problem that has been experienced in case law.1 57 A prefer-
155. Id. at 492-93.
156. Id. The suing minority shareholder was dissatisfied that her investment had not
generated a significant return, and she pointed to the corporate parent-subsidi-
ary relationship as evidence of wrongdoing. As the court stated, "[Plaintiffs case
... rests entirely upon the proposition that there is something inherently wrong
in permitting Securities to retain its personal holding company status to the fi-
nancial loss of its stockholders." Id. at 494. The particular decision at issue was
the decision of the parent holding company not to acquire additional shares of the
stock of its subsidiary upon issuance of new shares. The issuance of new shares
was, in the history of the companies, a singular action. Id. at 490-93.
157. See Fishman, supra note 7, at 250 (observing that boards tend to settle when an
attorney general brings an action against a charity, which contributes to the
dearth of guidance for board behavior).
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ence for models of proactive self-regulation and for more global (rather
than situational) approaches to governance and management has
emerged in the healthcare industry.158 As a procedural and economic
matter, self-regulation has been shown to be more cost effective and
better business for the corporation not only because efficiencies are
created from discovered internal problems, but also because litigation
and government intervention are extraordinarily costly, thereby
harming the entity and the community it serves. 159 The expectation
for high-level stewardship indicates that the decisionmaking of board
158. An example of this trend for the healthcare industry is the model corporate com-
pliance guidances issued by the Department of Health and Human Services Of-
fice of the Inspector General (OIG). See Department of Health and Human
Services Office of Inspector General, Compliance Guidance, http://oig.hhs.gov/
fraudlcomplianceguidance.html (providing guidance materials for the healthcare
industry). Sarbanes-Oxley appears to contribute to this trend as well. See BOARD
SOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-
PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2006), http://www.boardsource.org/clientfiles/Sarbanes-
Oxley.pdf (noting that nonprofits are not directly governed by Sarbanes-Oxley
but that the legislation does set benchmarks that are useful for the nonprofit
sector). Boards of directors are instructed to lead the march toward program in-
tegrity, which requires high levels of ethical behavior set by example at the top of
every healthcare organization. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & AM. HEALTH LAWYER ASS'N, CORPORATE RESPONSI-
BILITY AND CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: A RESOURCE FOR HEALTH CARE BOARDS OF
DIRECTORS 1, http:/oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/040203CorpResp
RsceGuide.pdf [hereinafter CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE]. The OIG now interprets the duty of care to include an understanding of a
healthcare entity's systems and the compliance program that is employed by the
entity. See id. at 1. The OIG, in conjunction with the American Health Lawyers
Association, created this document, in which they wrote: "Embedded within the
duty of care is the concept of reasonable inquiry. In other words, directors should
make inquiries to management to obtain information necessary to satisfy their
duty of care." Id. Citing In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation,
698 A.2d 959 (Del Ch. 1996) (which involved a shareholder derivative suit for
breach of the duty of care when directors approved kickbacks for prescription
practices), the guidance states that failure to "reasonably oversee the organiza-
tion's compliance program" or acting as "mere passive recipients of information"
can lead to violation of fiduciary duties. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPO-
RATE GUIDANCE, supra, at 1. Though the OIG acknowledges that directors are not
charged with day-to-day oversight of the organization (that is the role of manage-
ment in any organization), it still instructs directors that their obligations extend
to the oversight of compliance programs. See id. at 2-3.
159. See OIG Draft Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 69
Fed. Reg. 32,012 (2004). The OIG observes:
Compliance programs help hospitals fulfill their legal duty to refrain
from submitting false or inaccurate claims or cost information to the
Federal health care programs or engaging in other illegal practices. A
hospital may gain important additional benefits by voluntarily imple-
menting a compliance program, including:
* Demonstrating the hospital's commitment to honest and responsible
corporate conduct;
" increasing the likelihood of preventing, identifying, and correcting
unlawful and unethical behavior at an early stage;
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members faced with conflicts must be better informed and carefully
considered with an eye toward primacy of the duty of obedience.
Though volunteer board members have been let off the hook for lack of
training and for general ignorance in the ways of the healthcare busi-
ness world, governmental and community expectations have been
changing.160
Healthcare entities are different than other corporations and even
other nonprofits. Professor Hansmann has discussed the higher stan-
dard of healthcare nonprofits in terms of inequality of information
that leads to an imbalance between the patient and the healthcare
provider.161 Many regulators and consumers have been disturbed by
the rise of for-profit entities in healthcare precisely because health-
care is expected to be exceptional (and should not be motivated by
profit). 162 But the confusion surrounding duties goes beyond these
concerns, as conflicts can arise from information and from efforts at
control. Because directors are often chosen for their ties in the com-
munity, and sometimes because they sit on the boards of other key
businesses, "interested" transactions are not at all unusual and, per-
haps in certain instances, can be beneficial.16 3
A. Procedural Shifts
This Article suggests that several procedural changes are neces-
sary to facilitate responsible overlapping boards. First, duality or
multiplicity of interests must be recognized and revealed at the outset
of board service; directors should perform a kind of due diligence upon
being asked to serve and document any actual or potential conflicts of
interest. Second, nonprofit corporations should have more intelligible
articles of incorporation and bylaws so that directors (and their com-
munities) better understand the mission of the organization. 16 4
Third, though due diligence and proper documentation could lead to
" encouraging employees to report potential problems to allow for ap-
propriate internal inquiry and corrective action; and
" through early detection and reporting, minimizing any financial loss
to government and taxpayers, as well as any corresponding financial
loss to the hospital.
Id. at 32,013.
160. See CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE GUIDANCE, supra note 158, at 2
(noting that courts often apply the business judgment rule).
161. See Hansmann, supra note 67, at 844-45 (stating that nonprofit "enterprises"
meet the need created by a market failure that arises from beneficiaries' inability
to police certain producers of items or services, dubbed "contract failure").
162. See BRADFORD H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE: THE CHANGING
ACCOUNTABILITY OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS 7 (1991).
163. See Fishman, supra note 7, at 236 (writing that interested transactions are "often
a necessity" for nonprofit corporations).
164. Better sense of mission does not necessarily mean that the mission is constricted,
only that it is clearer.
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mitigation upon occurrence of a deviant event, the appropriate state
agency should at least share oversight with the state attorney general
to help inform the prosecution, which generally is not versed in the
intricacies of healthcare. Fourth, the RMNCA should be modernized
to catalyze a progression in nonprofit statutory law that would aid this
doctrinal evolution.165
1. Multiplicity of Interest-Documentation and Disclosure
The first procedural step requires recognition of the import of in-
terests that are divided before they are conflicted, meaning a diversion
of interest that arises from sitting on two boards, whether or not a
traditional financial conflict of interest arises. This is a procedural
issue because it requires directors to revise and refine the level, depth,
and most importantly the timing of disclosures of divisions of interest.
It requires substantive metamorphosis as well, but the end result is
an important change in procedure.
The idea of a duality, division, or multiplicity of interest serves as a
starting point. The AHA recognized the existence of a duality of inter-
est among board members in a series of management advisories that
have not been updated in over a decade (but that have been in circula-
tion since the 1970s); but rarely has duality been recognized as an
important precursor to a conflict of interest.1 6 6 Duality, or division, of
interest indicates that a director of a healthcare organization may
have concomitant obligations that can benefit or burden the institu-
tion. This duality is quite common for members of nonprofit boards of
directors who, as was discussed above, frequently sit on multiple
boards.167 Historically, this multiplicity was seen as beneficial to cor-
porations for the potential connections, both in the community and
economically, that could be made. 168 Today, with increased integra-
165. This last suggestion could be deemed substantive in nature as well as procedural.
166. See Am. Hosp. Ass'n, AHA Management Advisory: Ethical Conduct for Health
Care Institutions (1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ethical Conduct]; Am.
Hosp. Ass'n, AHA Management Advisory: Resolution of Conflicts of Interest
(1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter Resolution]; Am. Hosp. Ass'n, Guidelines:
Resolution of Conflicts of Interest in Health Care Institutions (1975) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Guidelines]. For a brief discussion (and one of the only dis-
cussions) of the problems healthcare institutions face due to dualities of interest,
see L. Edward Bryant, Jr., Responsibilities of Directors of Not-for-Profit Corpora-
tions Faced with Sharing Control with Other Nonprofit Organizations in Health
Industry Affiliations: A Commentary on Legal and Practical Realities, 7 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 139 (1998).
167. See Resolution, supra note 166, at 1 (introducing the idea that healthcare enti-
ties' administrators often have outside interests that affect and can be affected by
the decisions of a particular institution).
168. See Goldschmid, supra note 68, at 647-48 (noting that Professor Hansmann's
suggestion that all conflicted transactions be banned for nonprofit corporations is
impractical because interested transactions can be "useful" and directors with
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tion of healthcare entities and continued perceived benefit from multi-
ple board memberships, accepting the dual nature of multiple
memberships allows the context in which conflicts later arise to be
more informed.
Division allows for "divided loyalties" and does not implicate mone-
tary issues per se; it expands the scope of self-examination and self-
disclosure that must occur in order to properly serve multiple boards.
If such dualities are recognized, then a director would consider com-
peting interests and divulge information regarding her division of in-
terests earlier. The division or duality of interest that exists should be
immediately apparent upon appointment to a new board, and the di-
rector should document the circumstances that give rise to the divi-
sion as well as the reasons by which the director concludes that
service of multiple boards is acceptable. Directors are already charged
with a certain level of sophistication if they serve healthcare entities
in these times of heavy fraud enforcement.169
Directors should not be held to more than a "reasonableness" stan-
dard in performing this evaluation, much like the business judgment
rule.170 Unlike the business judgment rule, immunity is not being
proposed here, but the reasonableness standard is doctrinally familiar
and useful. Best practices would call for the corporation to keep a re-
cord of the director's due diligence; each director could be required to
list all boards on which they serve as a condition of board membership
to facilitate the information sharing and keeping.
Even with disclosure occurring earlier, directors need a compass
for making decisions. That compass could be, at least in part, effec-
tively drafted articles of incorporation and bylaws.
2. Charter Documentation
Insufficient charter documents contradict the stricter require-
ments non-profit corporations face regarding their creation and disso-
lution compared to other organizations.171 To enable directors to
connections in other organizations can be the most useful for nonprofits (citing
FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 58-69)).
169. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
170. See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 70, at 28-29. As the Guidebook states, "A director
exercising good-faith judgment will usually be protected from liability to the cor-
poration or to its membership under the Business Judgment Rule." Id. at 28. As
Daniel Kurtz puts it, nonprofit directors must act in a manner that is "plausibly
rational." KURTZ, supra note 65, at 49. Plausible rationality seems a fair stan-
dard here as well.
171. See Fishman, supra note 7, at 226 (noting that nonprofit corporations are the
favored form for charities to take because, compared to unincorporated associa-
tions and charitable trusts, nonprofit corporations have greater flexibility in gov-
ernance, though they must deal with greater formalities in their creation and
dissolution).
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perform initial due diligence, healthcare nonprofit organizations
should have well-crafted articles of incorporation and bylaws. 17 2 If
the articles of incorporation and bylaws clearly set forth the mission of
the organization, board members will be positively affected in at least
two ways. First, directors would be able to make a preliminary deter-
mination as to whether they can serve multiple healthcare entities.
Second, it would assist in the issue of nonprofits' accountability, which
has long been seen as a shortcoming of the nonprofit sector because of
the nebulousness of fiduciary duties and because of the lack of over-
sight (a diminished issue if the directors follow through on the sugges-
tions herein). 173
The preliminary determination as to whether multiple entities can
be served with fealty to charter mission and licensure mission can be
achieved if a nonprofit's charter documents facilitate the decisionmak-
ing process of directors. Without clear statements about the purposes
for which the organization was formed, the community that it serves,
and the manner in which directors are to make potentially conflicted
decisions, directors cannot be expected to understand the potential
danger (or utility) of sitting on multiple boards. States should require
more than just a recitation of the pertinent statutory nonprofit forma-
tion purposes. If the statutory requirement were to require, for in-
stance, a reflection of the licensure requirements for the entity, then
the articles of incorporation might aid the directors in understanding
and carrying out their organization's mission (and the state in enforc-
ing the mission).174
172. The articles of incorporation are the original documentation from the state that
create the corporation and set forth the purposes for which it is formed. The
bylaws are functionally a code of conduct for the corporation that set forth the
management and rules for the organization.
173. See Reiser, supra note 14, at 210-18 (dividing nonprofits' accountability into
three categories-financial accountability, mission accountability, and organiza-
tional accountability-in order to identify ways to address the long-standing con-
cerns about the nonprofit sector and its apparent lack of oversight and
accountability to the public).
174. The mission language in the charter could be affected by amendments to the ena-
bling licensure statute; however, licensure statutes tend not to change the pur-
pose or nature of the healthcare provider being regulated. Instead, licensure
statutes generally are amended to add conditions of licensure such as reporting
requirements or patient information requirements. If the statutory licensure
mission of the provider is not altered, then charter documents would not be af-
fected. Of course, hospital-licensure statutes (and other healthcare-licensure
statutes) can vary vastly from state to state. See John D. Blum, Beyond the By-
laws: Hospital-Physician Relationships, Economics, and Conflicting Agendas, 53
BUFF. L. REV. 459, 461, n.4 (2005) (using the examples of Delaware, Hawaii, and
Illinois's hospital-licensure statutes to display the variance within this category
of state statutory law).
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3. No Safe Harbor
It might appear that this Article, in proposing a procedure of due
diligence and documentation, is suggesting that directors who perform
such acts would be protected absolutely from investigation, prosecu-
tion, or other governmental oversight; however, no such safe harbor is
recommended. The division documentation could be a mitigating fac-
tor should the government investigate an organization, but it would
not be an absolute shield. Due diligence serves other purposes,
though: it enables investigating agencies to infer that a nonprofit's di-
rectors intended to take their governance role seriously, and it enables
government investigators to better understand the mission of the
organization.175
The question becomes which governmental agencies would best
oversee the activities of healthcare nonprofits. Attorneys general tra-
ditionally have the power to investigate the activities of nonprofits as
protectors of the communities served by nonprofits, but they are not
necessarily expert in the legal issues faced by nonprofits or the health-
care industry. 1 76 Also, some scholars have questioned exactly whom
the state attorney general is representing in actions taken against
nonprofits; oftentimes the attorney general's focus on financial issues
excludes the notion of fidelity to mission.177 Recent attorney general
actions do not necessarily protect the community intended to be
served by healthcare nonprofits; also, some unnecessary meddling in
governance affairs post-action has become controversial.178 For in-
stance, Attorney General Hatch named eight members to Medica's
board of directors once the split between Allina and Medica occurred.
The board members subsequently petitioned the court to terminate
their settlement with Hatch, charging too much interference in corpo-
rate affairs.1 79 Attorney General Hatch undoubtedly had a difficult
175. See Brody, supra note 14, at 975 (taking issue with the recent actions of attorneys
generals in the nonprofit sector, particularly with regard to their lack of under-
standing concerning the nature of nonprofits).
176. See id. at 977 ("[Sltate attorneys general have no necessary expertise, much less
the resources, to address the myriad concerns of the hundreds of thousands of
charities that function in the United States today.").
177. See Reiser, supra note 14, at 234-35 (asserting that attorneys general are overly
concerned with financial issues to the detriment of mission fidelity and corporate
accountability).
178. See Brody, supra note 14, at 1007.
179. See id. An editorial in the Star Tribune noted the unease of some observers when
the attorney general proposed to install his own board:
Some said it would give one elected official too much power over the
health care of 1 million Minnesota consumers; other said it would be a
conflict of interest for the state's top consumer watchdog to supervise a
company run by his own appointees .... If Hatch appointed competent
and honorable people, then a judge should ask why the attorney general
continues to second-guess their judgment. If Hatch appointed directors
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task in unwinding the underdeveloped and abandoned law in Minne-
sota regarding integrated service networks so that the development of
Allina could be understood separately from the shortcomings of the
state's failed legislative effort.l80 Undoubtedly conflicts of interest ex-
isted at Allina, but perhaps the attorney general's findings could have
been clarified, and thus more informative for directors of other inte-
grated healthcare entities, if the expertise of the relevant regulating
agencies had been utilized. Drawing on the ongoing example of Allina
and its continued fallout, it appears that other state agencies would
help to round out the oversight of healthcare entities and their
boards.18 '
To the extent it is apposite in a given state, the department of trea-
sury, the department of health, and the department of insurance
should be included as expert investigators and enforcers for health-
care nonprofits.18 2 The department of treasury is the entity that gen-
erally registers corporations; the department of health generally is the
entity that licenses healthcare organizations to provide services to the
community; and the department of insurance is the entity that li-
censes managed care entities and other health insurers. The mecha-
nism of oversight is simple: licensure. The licensure process creates
proficiency in healthcare that would help to address one of the most
frequent complaints about nonprofits-that they are unaccountable to
any shareholder or other overseeing interested party.' 8 3 In health-
care, the regulating agencies could be considered interested parties.
Though they may lack expertise specific to the corporate sphere, regu-
lating agencies have knowledge that could help eliminate the awk-
ward assumptions of attorneys general and help reduce the
interference of the cy pres-like machinations that have been witnessed
who are bungling the job, then a judge should ask why the attorney gen-
eral should be allowed to repeat the experiment.
Id. at 1007-08 (citing Editorial, Hatch vs. Medica; Attorney General Should Let It
Be, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), May 10, 2003, at A22. Additional anecdotes
are well described by Brody. See Brody, supra note 14, at 984-1018.
180. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
181. See Neal Gendler, Judge Ends Medica Suit by Hatch, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis,
Minn.), Aug. 19, 2005, at 1A.
182. Attendance to state-oriented issues becomes particularly sticky if the healthcare
entity spans multiple states. As became apparent in Health Midwest v. Kline,
No. 02-CV-08043, 2003 WL 328845, at *16-17 (D. Kan. Feb. 6, 2003), attempting
to adhere to state regulations across borders can be a significant challenge. See
Greaney & Boozang, supra note 14, at 27-30 (describing the "border war" that
arose between Missouri and Kansas); see also Brody, supra note 14, at 1008-17
(describing the Health Midwest pleadings).
183. See Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should Not
Curb Board Discretion Over a Charitable Corporation's Mission and Unrestricted
Assets, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 689-93 (2005) (describing failure of accounta-
bility to introduce the idea that agency theory may be better suited to nonprofit
corporations than trust theory or corporate theory).
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recently.14 Some have suggested that special commissions could be
formed to help with oversight of nonprofits, but improvements in the
functioning of healthcare nonprofits, whether or not they have over-
lapping boards, would not necessarily be enhanced by an extra layer of
nonexpert oversight.1 s5
4. Revise the RMNCA
The original Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (Model Act) was cre-
ated in 1954 and was the result of a joint effort between the ABA and
the American Law Institute. Upon completion, the majority of states
adopted it.186 The RMNCA remains the primary model for states'
nonprofit corporation statutes.1 8 7
One of the major deficiencies of the Model Act, and thus the
RMNCA as well, is that the drafters of the Model Act adopted the
Model Business Corporation Act virtually wholesale (with the exclu-
sion of provisions that clearly could not apply to nonprofit corpora-
tions, such as stockholders rights).188 As has been stated here already
and observed by others in the past, the drafters did not include gui-
dance on fiduciary duties in the Model Act.1 s9 While this deficiency
was partially rectified by the inclusion of a description of conflicts of
interest for nonprofit directors in the RMNCA,190 the extant model
policy on conflicts of interest is not sufficient for modern healthcare
organizations.
The RMNCA is ripe for another reconfiguration, one that encour-
ages coherence in understanding the fiduciary duties of nonprofit di-
184. See Brody, supra note 14, at 957 (describing the ability of courts to modify chari-
table trusts when their purposes have become impossible to carry out under the
cy pres doctrine).
185. See Fishman, supra note 7, at 222 (recommending the creation of public-private
charity commissions to improve the problem of accountability for charitable orga-
nizations in general and with no particular focus on the unique issues faced by
healthcare entities).
186. See Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current
Trends Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 807, 810-11 (1989) (discuss-
ing the "organizational" history of nonprofit corporations in the context of then-
current legal trends).
187. See id. at 810.
188. See id. at 814 (describing the Model Act as unstable for lack of any clear theory or
vision of the nonprofit as a separate creature from the for-profit corporation).
189. See id. (stating that the Model Act was "muddled concerning permissible pur-
poses for incorporation, vague and excessively permissive about distributions of
net assets to members on dissolution, and completely silent about the critical is-
sue of directors' and officers' fiduciary obligations").
190. The RMNCA is based in part on the California nonprofit corporation statute,
which divides nonprofits into three categories and was the source of some
bemusement by nonprofit scholars. See id. at 816-19 (deriding the three-cate-
gory approach to nonprofit statutes as "poorly conceived to meet the needs of the
nonprofit sector and its patrons").
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rectors. While many scholars have espoused the notion of the duty of
obedience, courts have yet to adopt the doctrine with any consistency
or vigor. 191 Because so many states follow the RMNCA, a new revi-
sion could influence states' recognition of the importance of the duty of
obedience, particularly in parsing the duties of directors who serve
multiple boards. Also, the RMNCA must be modified to recognize that
directors do often serve multiple boards and attempt to assist in the
multiplicity-of-interest conundrum. Revising the RMNCA to substan-
tively address the doctrine of fiduciary duties could help to move past
the disparate attempts to reconcile traditional duties with modern
board structures.
B. Substantive Shifts
If the fact of overlapping board membership is accepted as a start-
ing point, then the question that must be asked (and that has never
been answered) is not just whether a director can be fair to both (or
many) entities, but also how. Directors need efficient and ethical
means to serve more than one board of directors, which also indicates
that potential conflicts should be addressed before they arise. This
may signify that directors determine that some conflicts are accept-
able because licensure missions align; or, this may indicate that direc-
tors cannot serve multiple healthcare organizations' boards,
particularly in situations involving a form of vertical integration.
Substantively, the law should be modified to recognize the possible
range of conflicts, not just the traditional and limited idea of financial
conflicts of interest, and that sometimes the traditional conflicts
should not be a cause for concern in modern healthcare. 192 First, the
duty of obedience should be recognized as the third leg in a tripod of
fiduciary duties for healthcare nonprofits. An additional needed de-
velopment in the doctrine of the duty of obedience is to bifurcate it into
charter mission and licensure mission. This would inspire discussion
of conflict or congruence of mission rather than limiting dualities of
interest to being interpreted automatically as conflicts of financial in-
terest. Second, the duty of obedience facilitates the interpretation and
understanding of the duty of loyalty such that a director should know
whether she could act in the best interests of more than one corpora-
tion. Also, the duty of care can be informed by the duty of obedience
and the duty of loyalty, so directors recognize that the information
necessary to fulfill the duty of care may mean violating the duty of
loyalty or the duty of mission, and could make service of multiple
boards untenable in certain situations.
191. See supra section III.B.
192. See Reiser, supra note 14, at 234-35 (discussing the tendency of"activist AGs" to
focus on financial issues).
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1. Elevating and Parsing the Duty of Obedience: Charter
Mission and Licensure Mission
The duty of obedience, or more appropriately, the duty of mission,
may be the best conduit to revising norms. 193 The "duty to ensure
that the charitable mission of the corporation is carried out"194 should
no longer be a subsidiary piece of the duty of care analysis. The duty
of obedience is a crucial aspect of the doctrine of fiduciary duties for
healthcare nonprofits (and perhaps healthcare for-profits). The extant
definition of the duty of obedience, which requires adherence to the
mission of the organization and faithfulness to the laws applicable to
the organization, is too nebulous to be doctrinally sound. At least with
regard to healthcare nonprofits, the notion of fidelity to mission
should be comprised of two elements: adherence to charter mission
and adherence to licensure mission.
Charter mission would be established in the stated objectives of
the corporation that render it eligible for nonprofit status. Thus, the
charter mission is dictated in part by the requirements of the non-
profit statute of the home charter state and in part by the language in
documents like the articles of incorporation and bylaws of an organi-
zation (which should be drafted according to the new procedures set
forth above). It was the charter mission, set forth in the certificate of
incorporation, that the court in MEETH relied on in determining that
the sale of MEETH's property and establishment of community clinics
was not true to the mission of being a "hospital in the City, County,
and State of New York."195 Charter mission is limited by the purposes
for which a nonprofit corporation can be formed in the state of incorpo-
ration; thus, the charter mission of a subsidiary could not be written
(manipulated) to serve a system or a parent corporation, because
those are not accepted reasons for forming nonprofit corporations.
Licensure mission would invoke the state's statutory vision of the
healthcare entity's social role to determine if the entity is behaving in
a way that is true to its delineated healthcare function. The activities
of healthcare nonprofits are therefore governed, constrained, and de-
fined by both their charter mission and the licensure mission as set
forth by the states in which the entity provides healthcare services.
To require nonprofit healthcare organizations to only adhere to their
charter mission is to look at the picture with one eye. Licensure is
pivotal in determining the nature and purpose of a healthcare entity.
Depending on state requirements, it can even make a for-profit behave
193. As has been stated by Professor Hansmann, the "principal function of the non-
profit form" is to "serve effectively as fiduciaries for their patrons." Hansmann,
supra note 186, at 819.
194. MEETH, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
195. Id. at 577.
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like a nonprofit. 196 Thus, whether or not a healthcare nonprofit drafts
its documents to reflect both corporate and licensure requirements for
the type of services provided, directors must understand that their
duty of obedience is comprised specifically of the two elements of char-
ter mission and licensure mission. The last aspect of the duty of obedi-
ence, adherence to applicable laws, is not essential to the analysis; it
evokes the duty of care, which would be violated if directors were to
ignore all laws that apply to a given entity. Perhaps this vague and
overly broad element of the duty of obedience has stood in the way of
the principle being fully accepted. Regardless, the duty of obedience
can now be described as adherence to charter mission and licensure
mission, which can then help with interpretation of the duty of loyalty.
2. Duty of Loyalty Viewed Through Duty of Obedience
The baseline for the duty of loyalty informed by duty of obedience
is that multiple directorships are common, though they can be vexa-
tious.1 9 7 Thus, the predicate goal is not to eliminate overlap, but to
196. For an example of such legislation, see N.J. REV. STAT. § 26:2H-18.51 (2005),
which requires all general hospitals to provide charity care services and provides
subsidies to the hospitals that bear the charity care burden the most through a
state fund. The legislative history notes the policy goals of the state:
Access to quality health care shall not be denied to residents of this State
because of their inability to pay for the care; there are many residents of
this State who cannot afford to pay for needed hospital care and in order
to ensure that these persons have equal access to hospital care, it is nec-
essary to provide disproportionate share hospitals with a charity care
subsidy supported by a broad-based funding mechanism.
Id.
197. Louis Brandeis disagreed with this premise, though his comments about overlap-
ping directorates were famously (or infamously) made in the context of the domi-
nance of the banking industry in the early 1900s, which Brandeis dubbed the
"Money Trust." See generally BRANDEIS, supra note 1. The passing and context of
time help to dispel the unease that comes from his statement:
The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It of-
fends laws human and divine. Applied to rival corporations, it tends to
the suppression of competition and to violation of the Sherman law. Ap-
plied to corporations which deal with each other, it tends to disloyalty
and to violation of the fundamental law that no man can serve two
masters.
Id. at 51. Brandeis continued:
But the compelling reason for prohibiting interlocking directorates is
neither the protection of stockholders, nor the protection of the public
from the incidents of inefficiency and graft. Conclusive evidence (if ob-
tainable) that the practice of interlocking directorates benefited all
stockholders and was the most efficient form of organization, would not
remove the objections. For even more important than efficiency are in-
dustrial and political liberty; and these are imperiled by the Money
Trust.
Id. at 62. Efficiency is indeed one of the dominant reasons that overlapping
boards occur in healthcare, making it more difficult to dismiss the need for effi-
ciency for the benefit of "liberty" as Brandeis advocated.
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decide when it is appropriate and how directors can work through
multiplicities of interest based upon their understanding of the mis-
sion of each organization and the healthcare system with which the
organization may be affiliated. The duty of loyalty analysis for non-
profits still bears the marks of its origins in for-profit corporate law.
But considering only financial interests when evaluating conflicts is
limiting and insufficient for healthcare nonprofits. The overarching
concept of the duty of loyalty-acting in the best interests of the corpo-
ration at all times-is informative, but impracticable when serving
multiple healthcare organizations. 19 8 If the assessment of conflicts is
expanded to include an evaluation of conflicting missions, however,
then the duty of loyalty can be a more meaningful, proactive, and
global doctrine.
Directors should determine whether they could properly act in the
best interests of an organization by drawing upon the charter and li-
censure mission of each organization. As Attorney General Hatch cor-
rectly noted in the Allina investigation, the missions of HMOs and
hospitals may always conflict. 199 A director being asked by an HMO
to keep the costs of care down, and being asked by hospitals to in-
crease reimbursement to provide more and better in-patient care ser-
vices, may find that she is constantly at odds with herself and unable
to wear both directorial hats for a vertically integrated healthcare sys-
tem. Only by understanding the dual nature of the healthcare entity's
mission can a director make a meaningful decision about her duty of
loyalty to each organization. Alternatives to limiting board member-
ships may need to be found, for instance, by allowing for nonvoting
board members, or by including ex officio members without voting
rights, or by balancing board membership so that the original entity
cannot be outvoted by allied entities.
3. Duty of Care Informed by the Other Two Fiduciary Duties
The duty of care is not necessarily violated by serving multiple
boards so long as attention is paid to each board. This is more a prac-
tical, temporal matter than a legal matter; and the duty of care is the
least problematic duty in board overlap, unless a director is too busy
with other boards to properly monitor organizational activities. Recall
that the duty of care is a measure of a director's attention to a particu-
lar entity for which she sits on a board; in order to fulfill the duty of
care, the director must act in a reasonably informed manner. The idea
that directors should adhere to the laws applicable to the organization
198. Though Brandeis may have been onto something, see supra note 197 and accom-
panying text, this Article accepts the current condition of healthcare organiza-
tions in which overlapping boards are prevalent and unlikely to diminish in the
near future.
199. See COMPLIANCE REVIEW, supra note 29, pt. 2, § 2.5, at 9.
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belongs here, not under the duty of obedience. If a director has per-
formed the appropriate due diligence and has determined that the
duty of obedience and the duty of loyalty can be served, then the duty
of care will likely fall in line. It is thus the last priority in resolving
multiplicities of interest.
C. Reevaluating Multiple Board Memberships
To fulfill its ethical duties, a board must not only keep corporate
and charitable purposes in sight, it must also consider the public's
viewpoint and assure the healthcare consumer that decisions have
been made in an ethically sound and effective manner. With an ethi-
cal lens placed over the new perception of fiduciary duties described
above, it becomes clear that directors may need to limit the number of
boards on which they serve, particularly if the entities have conflicting
charter or licensure missions; but, the community and/or healthcare
consumer may be better served by directors sitting on multiple boards.
Revisiting the three examples helps to focus the implications of revis-
ing fiduciary duties for healthcare nonprofits.
1. Vertically Integrated Systems
The breakup of Allina Health System has served as a warning to
many in the healthcare industry about sloppy alliances and the import
of attention to mission, but the industry might have learned more if
the Compliance Review had included an analysis of Allina's corporate
structure, which separated the hospital and health insurance divi-
sions into independent nonprofit corporations with overlapping boards
of directors for control purposes. "Obvious" conflicts of interest arose
between the mission of Medica as a health maintenance organization
and the mission of the Allina Health System, conflicts that appeared
to deprive the Medica directors of the ability to consider the best inter-
ests of the HMO's enrollees.200 Any action taken by the board of ei-
ther entity contrary to the mission of the entity would therefore be a
conflict of interest and potentially impermissible as a breach of the
duty of loyalty and the duty of obedience. 2 01
Hatch hit a fountainhead of potential exposition: When finance
and service are combined, can directors ever be faithful to their fiduci-
ary duties for each organization? It could be difficult. Applying the
"bifurcated duty of obedience informing duty of loyalty" analysis in
combination with procedural improvements advocated above, it seems
200. See id. § 2.21, at 33.
201. The Compliance Review does not delineate the duties violated this specifically,
but it does conclude that the series of conflicted transactions led to higher premi-
ums for Medica policyholders, which contravened Medica's mission as an HMO
and would not have occurred but for the dominance of Allina. See id. at 35.
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that directors would have to recognize from the inception of their ser-
vices that the financial entity and the service entity in a vertically
integrated delivery system will have conflicting missions. Unless the
entity were truly integrated into a staff-model HMO, the licensure
mission of each entity will have inherent tensions that will not be re-
solved by "inform and recuse." The directors of the HMO would al-
ways be attempting to serve their charter and licensure mission of
creating economic efficiencies. The directors of the hospital (or hospi-
tal system) would serve their charter and licensure missions by seek-
ing to increase and improve the institutional care of human beings.
The directors who serve both entities could reasonably conclude,
before sitting through even one board meeting, that they would en-
counter conflicts of mission at every turn. Had the Allina directors
performed this analysis, they could have avoided a good amount of the
scrutiny they faced. If they had decided that board overlap was appro-
priate after performing the due diligence on their charter and licen-
sure missions, then each fund shift between entities would also have
been analyzed with an eye toward the licensure mission conflict
they were facing in addition to the duty of loyalty issues that were
created. It would have been clear that keeping Medica in the
Medicare+Choice market in order to serve the needs of Allina's hospi-
tals was not only a breach of the duty of obedience, but also a breach of
the duty of loyalty. The analysis would be similar in any vertically
integrated system, though not all are created and run like Allina.
2. Horizontally Integrated Systems
The clarifications that result from including the charter mission/
licensure mission bifurcation can be seen as well in the second exam-
ple, wherein a typical hospital system of multiple hospitals is gov-
erned by one umbrella board of directors or by boards of directors with
overlapping members. The board members of the suburban hospitals
are potentially breaching their fiduciary duties to the individual sub-
urban hospitals simply by supporting Urban Hospital, but the public
fisc and the public health are served by maintaining Urban Hospital.
If the public benefits from the directors of a horizontally integrated
system supporting the member hospitals of the system, then the direc-
tors should not be held accountable for breaching fiduciary duties. If
we apply the obedience-informing-loyalty analysis, the missions of the
hospitals align from a licensure perspective. Each of the institutional
entities in a horizontally integrated system will have the goal of (by
example) the institutional care of human beings. Further, states tend
to impose similar requirements on institutional healthcare entities to
maintain their nonprofit status, such as the provision of charity care.
Thus, even though they are separately incorporated, the organizations
have virtually identical licensure missions. The ultimate simplifying
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approach would be for the hospitals to merge, but mergers and acqui-
sitions can be tricky for regulatory reasons, such as the difficulty in-
volved in combining and obtaining Medicare provider numbers (the
major source of income for many hospitals) and in reforming hospitals'
contractual relationships with other healthcare entities and provid-
ers. 202 Also, licensure may restrain a hospital from composing itself
as one corporate entity with many facilities.2 03
Recognition of similar licensure missions creates a new under-
standing of overlapping directors in horizontally integrated systems.
Instead of breaching their duty of obedience, they may instead be en-
hancing it if they serve multiple entities in one system. In the exam-
ple of the urban-suburban system, the directors are not necessarily
violating the duty of obedience by creating centers of excellence or by
financially supporting the less stable Urban Hospital.2 04 The tradi-
tional financially focused analysis of the duty of loyalty would require
the directors to keep the money and to reinvest it in Hospital A and
Hospital B. But if the duty of loyalty is informed by the duty of obedi-
ence, the directors would not be breaching their duty of loyalty to shift
money to Urban Hospital to keep it afloat, as they share the same
market and the same patients, and all of them will potentially be
stronger from a mission perspective if Urban Hospital does not go
bankrupt.
202. See Carl H. Hitchner, Clare Richardson, Judith E. Solomon & Charles B. Oppen-
heim, Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of Organizational Models, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 273, 284 (1994). The authors note the difficulties facing health-
care entities seeking to fully integrate, stating that IDSs face
daunting legal obstacles. A basic issue, for example, is the ability of an
integrated delivery system itself to obtain its own Medicare provider
number and bill for all system services. Because integrated delivery sys-
tems often are comprised of a number of separate legal entities, particu-
larly with respect to the physician component, single point billing would
require assignment of claims to the system's billing entity.
Id. (footnote omitted). The authors proceed to list serious complications arising
from Medicare reimbursement rules, and conclude by noting, "Under these statu-
tory and regulatory constraints, many integrated delivery systems find it difficult
to function effectively as integrated billing units for Medicare purposes." Id. at
285.
203. See Thomas H. Brock, Minimizing Antitrust Exposure in a Virtual Merger-Tips
for Hospitals Entering Virtual Mergers, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Sept. 1999, at
38, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi m3257/is_9_53/ai_
55834426 (noting that hospitals "face difficulties in attempting to fully combine
disparate systems of governance, administration, and day-to-day operations" and
other problems unique to the highly regulated nature of hospitals and other
healthcare entities).
204. On the other hand, if the urban patients cannot realistically reach the centers of
excellence when their services are required, then the directors on the board of
Urban Hospital have violated their duty of obedience with regard to Urban
Hospital.
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In instances where the duty of loyalty might once have been vio-
lated, we see that the duty of obedience influences the understanding
of "conflict" to draw the focus to serving the community rather than
focusing on the current transaction's financial impact. The global ap-
proach is more satisfying for a healthcare nonprofit and helps direc-
tors to perform their duties in a more proactive, comprehensive way.
Also, this interpretation of the fiduciary duties of nonprofit directors is
consistent with the desire to infuse nonprofit law with trust principles
that have often been peripherally informative but not comfortably doc-
trinally infused into nonprofit directors' fiduciary duties.
3. Smaller Alliances
Hometown Hospital and HHA share board members in the last ex-
ample; the overlapping board does not exist to create an integrated
delivery system, and no formal contracts exist between the entities.
Nevertheless, the alliance is beneficial to both entities in terms of re-
lationship building and maintenance. In the small community, the
boards contain overlapping members because the community lacks op-
tions and because overlap helps to keep business flowing. When HHA
decides to serve Neighbor Hospital, board members who sit on both
boards may suffer from divided loyalties. One of the most difficult is-
sues that arises is whether the directors have a duty to inform
Hometown Hospital of the new branch of potentially competing busi-
ness. If the directors who sit on HHA's board reveal the information
to Hometown Hospital's board, then they will breach their duty of loy-
alty to HHA; and if they do not reveal the information, they breach
their fiduciary duties to Hometown Hospital.
The bifurcated duty of obedience analysis will be influenced by the
community that the charter mission identifies as the one to be served
by each entity. If one entity serves a larger catchment area than the
other, then the charter mission may help the directors to determine
whether they need to reveal the potential line of new business. For
instance, if Hometown Hospital serves a smaller geographic area than
HHA, then HHA's directors may decide that no conflict of mission ex-
ists when the HHA starts to serve another local hospital that by virtue
of the HHA's charter mission is properly served. The licensure mis-
sions of the entities are likely complementary (patient service in an
institution versus patient service in the patient's home).
Where the duty of obedience analysis only moderately assists in
analyzing the new business for HHA, the duty of loyalty helps to de-
termine whether the directors have a duty to reveal the information
they have to the Hometown Hospital board. In the example, we see
the limitations of the traditional interpretation of the duty of loyalty,
as no financial usurpation or opportunity actually exists; the hospital
does not have its own home health agency and would not be able to
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perform the services that HHA is proposing to expand to Neighbor
Hospital. Fears of service loss, and perhaps a fear of competition, le-
gitimately exist, but that does not fit squarely within the traditional
definition of conflict of interest.205 Nevertheless, if information can be
deemed a potential source of conflict, viewing the informational ten-
sion of the directors through the lens of serving the community, then
the directors should inform the board of Hometown Hospital of HHA's
plan to extend services and, in the subsequent vote regarding HHA,
recuse themselves depending on the context of the vote. Avoidance of
breaching the duty of loyalty to HHA is aided by considering the needs
of the community as it is served by both entities as viewed through
their charter missions and licensure missions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Overlapping boards of directors are a fixture in nonprofit health-
care organizations, yet little guidance is available to their directors or
the agencies that regulate them. While overlapping boards can be
beneficial, they can also lead organizations astray. The key for direc-
tors is to determine whether they can or should serve multiple boards,
and what effect their multiplicity of interest will have on their role in
the governance of various organizations. A part of the solution is reso-
lution of the temporal problem-what "conflict" means and when it
must be considered-and must take into account many factors, includ-
ing the social function of nonprofit healthcare organizations, the suita-
bility of traditional corporate norms to the governance of those
enterprises, and the importance of mission to healthcare entities in
serving a community. It is unreasonable to expect directors to adhere
to high ideals of fiduciary responsibility when they have no guidance
for such responsibility or the means by which they can explore its
contours.
To achieve this from a procedural perspective, multiplicity of inter-
ests must be recognized and revealed at the outset of board service by
having directors perform due diligence upon being asked to serve on
any board and to document all actual or potential conflicts. Better
drafted articles of incorporation and bylaws would help directors to
understand and maintain the charter and licensure mission of the or-
ganization. To facilitate the state's dealings with healthcare nonprof-
205. Fear of competition is not a legally acceptable reason to withhold information, as
it could potentially result in a Sherman Act violation. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(2000). On the other hand, Sherman Act violations rely on restraint of trade
among the states (its source of authority is the Commerce Clause, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2000)), so with a local hospital and healthcare providers, the chances of the
Department of Justice becoming involved are slim. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ANTI-TRUST DIVISION M uAL ch. II, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch2.htm#al.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
its, the healthcare-specialized agencies should at least share oversight
with the state attorney general. Also, the RMNCA should be revised
to catalyze an evolution in nonprofit statutory law.
Additionally, from a substantive perspective, the possible range of
conflicts for nonprofit healthcare directors, not just the traditional and
limited idea of financial conflicts of interest, must be defined and ap-
plied. The duty of obedience should be recognized as doctrinally es-
sential for defining fiduciary duties for healthcare nonprofits. The
duty of obedience should be bifurcated into charter mission and licen-
sure mission, which would allow a discussion of conflict of mission
rather than just conflicts of financial interest. The duty of obedience
can then enlighten the interpretation and understanding of the duty
of loyalty such that a director may know at the outset whether she
could act in the best interests of more than one corporation. Also, the
duty of care can be informed by the duty of obedience and the duty of
loyalty so that directors recognize that information that is necessary
to fulfill the duty of care may lead to violating the duty of loyalty or
the duty of obedience. Each of these steps should aid directors serving
overlapping boards to avoid the "evils" that have been much discussed
but little defined.
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